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ABSTRACT

President Richard NLxon’s decision to unofficially recognize Communist China during the
early 1970s represented an apparently sudden political and strategic turnabout for both he and the
United States. After decades of virulent anti-Communism upon which a meteoric political career was
built Nixon, faced with mounting domestic pressures to end the Vietnam War and the necessity of
obtaining policy concessions from the Soviet Union, embarked upon a course of detente with
Mainland China that seemed to completely contradict his hawkish. Cold Warrior image. Far from
being a strictly political maneuver in the months leading to the 1972 presidential election. Nixon's
decision was instead a pragmatic, geopolitical strategy designed as much to pressure the U S S R, and
balance the power in Asia as it was to bring the Chinese back into the world community of nations.
Richard Nixon's conservative background made the decision and subsequent Peking summit possible,
as did his diplomatic partnership with Henry Kissinger.

lU
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INTRODUCTION

President Nixon's trip to Communist China in 1972 was the symbolic capstone of his own
China initiative, conceived before his administration began and leaving its legacy well into the Carter
administration. With satellite television beaming images of Nixon and Mao as well as Nixon at the
Great Wall to the entire world, the President achieved his greatest foreign policy success in the form
of an unprecedented personal and political reversal of policy. Long the preeminent Republican anti
communist spokesman and courtier of the right wing, Richard Nixon seemed to be one of the least
likely presidents of the Cold War era to attempt detente with the People's Republic of China.
His decision to unofficially recognize China was one of great paradox and philosophical
contradiction; Nixon the crusading anti-Communist suddenly, upon reaching the presidency,
engineered a major change in U.S. foreign policy that entailed detente overtures to both Communist
China and the U.S.S.R.. implacable enemies of American and American conservatives. The switch
from the aggressive containment policy of the Eisenhower administration to balance-of-power
strategy anchored in the Nixon Doctrine of regional defense pacts was in reaction to an emerging
multipolaric world in which the United States had neither the resources or popular will to serve as
global policeman. Nixon, assuming the presidency as a compromise candidate, attempted to end
hostilities with China to end the war in Vietnam and prevent ultimately futile confrontations with
communist forces in Asia in the future.
To position himself in a politically acceptable position to unveil his China initiative. Nixon
promoted himself to the American public as a sensible, law-and-order conservative with virtually
unparalleled foreign policy credentials, built through years of public service. Within the Republican
Party. Nixon's years of fundraising, speechmaking for candidates and hard-line stance against world
communism offset lingering doubts true conservatives harbored over his presidential potential. Only
1
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as a staunch Republican trying to save American lives in Southeast Asia could Richard Nixon have
overtly pursued detente with Communist China, a move that would have been politically impossible
for a Democratic president.
The following pages will trace the (fynamics of Richard Nixon's rise to political power as
well as the nature of his evolving philosophies, the strategic factors and circumstances that informed
the detente decision, and the summit itself as well as its after effects. The thesis of this work is that
the China initiative, despite its outward appearance as a pre-election political move, was actually
designed to gain diplomatic leverage over the U.S.S.R. to pressure the Soviets into arms control and
other policy concessions. Taking advantage of the deepening Sino-Soviet schism and their respective
paranoia of future violent aggression against one another. Nixon's detente overture to Communist
China was a purely geopolitical strategy that completely disregarded his past anti-Communism and
contradicted the staimchly pro-American image that he had risen to power on.
Many contemporary biographies and works tracing Richard Nixon's public career have
concentrated on portraying him as a political animal.' a man consumed with achieving power
through politics regardless of the cost to others and weighing policy decisions by their cost or benefit
to him politically. Tom Whicker s One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream gives us the
image of a skilled politician who valued political tact over personal character, a Nixon who entered
politics ostensibly to overcome low self-esteem and gain public approval. In the same vein. Roger
Morris' Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of An American Politician portrays the president as an
overachiever who defined life by winning or losing, a negative interpretation of Nixon that links his
accomplishments to an unquenchable thirst for personal gain and recognition. Highly negative in
tenor and bordering on vicious. Fawn Brodie s Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character
described a Nixon consumed by an internal rage that convinced him that destructive attacks and
pathological lying without remorse were acceptable means to the end of political power, his lone goal.
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Also portraying Nixon as a negative personality type with pathological tendencies was Bruce Mazlish.
whose In Search of Nixon: A Psvcho-Historical Inouirv focused more on Nixon's early relations with
his family than Brodie did. concluding that his repressed relationship with his mother Haima Nixon
contributed to his later self-destructive tendencies.
However, upon close examination of Nixon's own words and more strategic interpretations
of his career and policy motives, it becomes apparent that detente \vith Communist China had much
less to do with political considerations than what may have been believed or assumed at the time.
Instead, as Nixon wrote in the retrospective In The Arena, the China initiative had nothing to do with
his attitude towards communism, an attitude that had generated enough political capital over the
decades to elevate him from the House of Representatives, to the Senate, to the vice-presidency and
finally to the Presidency in 1968. Nixon's memoir. R.N.: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, traces the
evolution of the China plan, and makes minimal mention of domestic political concerns other than
the need to have kept the plan confidential until the right moment. Detente overtures formulated by
Nixon and Henry Kissinger were part of a larger strategy not only to end the war in Vietnam, but also
designed to eliminate automatic future U.S. military entanglements in Asia to combat Communist
aggression, an option no longer tenable due heavy American casualties in Southeast Asia and
growing domestic discontent with the U.S. role as world policeman. A skilled statesman and personal
diplomatist. Nixon's trip to Peking achieved foreign policy goals simultaneously: a thaw in relations
and an opening of communications with Communist China, as well as indirectly increasing pressure
on the U.S.S.R. to cease aggression in Asia and make arms control concessions to the U.S.
Over the years, strategically and policy-oriented works on Richard Nixon have generally
been more sympathetic to his legacy and himself than those based on explaining his actions based on
character. Particularly admiring of Nixon is C.L. Sulzberger’s The World and Richard Nixon, a book
documenting the President’s foreign policy initiatives that commends Nixon for vision and necessary
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risk-taking on initiatives concerning Communist China and the U.S.S.R. While characterizing Nixon
as a semi-distant figure with a quirky personality, former Nixon speechwriter Frank Mankiewicz
nonetheless recognized his foreign policy record as the outstanding part of his presidency in Perfectly
Clear: Nixon from Whittier to Watergate. Stephen Ambrose’ Richard Nixon: The Triumph of a
Politician. 1962-1974 devotes several pages to the China initiative, portraying it as a momentous
achievement brought about largely by Nixon himself. Though Ambrose was not enamored with
Nixon's personality or ascent to power, his exploration of Nixon's diplomacy revealed it to be highly
visionary and conducted in a secretive maimer that led to its success. Perhaps the most flattering
biography of Nixon consulted for this work was Jonathan Aitken's Nixon: A Life. Very respectful of
Nixon's political career as well as his foreign policy record, it is perhaps ironic that the volume is the
only major Nixon biography to be written by a non-American, in this case a British Member of
Parliament.
The substantial role of Henry Kissinger in the detente initiative has been acknowledged in
several volumes about the Nixon administration as well as Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, although
judgments about Kissisngcr's performance itself has been mixed. Marvin and Bernard Kalb's
Kissinger, written in the wake of Watergate, treats Kissinger's role in Nixonian diplomacy as being
indispensable, as does Robert Littwak in his scholarly Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American
Foreign Policv and the Pursuit of Stability. 1969-1976. Kissinger's own White House Years describes
pre-summit negotiations and backchannel diplomacy in more detail than Nixon's memoirs and may
be the preeminent source for behind the scenes information on the events leading to Peking. Highly
critical of both men and their respective styles is Seymour Hersch’s The Price of Power, a volume that
gives Nixon most of the credit for detente but finds major flaws in the apparent usurpation of
diplomatic power that the two engaged in away from the State Department.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

5

In essence. Richard Nixon's decision to recognize Communist China was a non-partisan
action made possible by his own past political career. Having built a reputation on years of antiCommunism. hard-line stances against those he perceived to be the slightest bit unpatriotic and
extensive foreign policy experience. Nixon found himself in an opportune position in 1972 to change
long-standing U.S. policy toward China without risking inordinate political damage. Impossible for a
liberal Democrat to pull off in the prevailing Cold War atmosphere. Nixon's trip to China was above
politics but at the same time made possible by it. The longtime cold warrior took advantage of his
stock of conservative political capital to advance his administration’s agenda and prevent future
Vietnams. at the minimal cost in hindsight of starkly reversing himself.
With a diplomatic initiative of the magnitude of detente with Communist China, several
peripheral issues were involved in a web of negotiation, domestic politics and geopolitical strategies.
This study focuses on the China policy of Richard Nixon and his evolving attitudes toward
Communist contaimnent and will superficially explore the link of Vietnam to the initiative as well as
the China policies of Presidents Ford and Carter. Though the latter subjects stand on their own merit
in relation to Nixon-era recognition of China, a degree of restraint must be placed on the main thesis.
Thus. Richard Nixon, monumental world statesman to some and conservative turncoat to
others, presents an enduring enigma to the understanding of his China. Contradictory from a political
viewpoint but logical from the diplomatic perspective. President Nixon's decision to pursue detente
with Communist China was an important post-World War II foreign policy objective that helped
define U.S.-Sino relations in the modem era. The man. his past and the summit itself coalesced into a
subject that is as fascinating as it is complex, as contradictory as it is clear.
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CHAPTER I

Background to Nixon’s Detente Overtures

In 1946, the year in which Richard Nixon was elected to Congress, the “loss” of China loomed as
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces were engaging in a civil war with Mao Tse-Tung's Communists
for control of Mainland China and the minds of the Chinese people. For a hundred years before the
image of China in the United States had been one of an exotic, potentially endless market for U.S.
manufactured goods, whose subjection to American benevolence and Christian ideals would represent
a natural westward extension of Manifest Destiny. Although the U.S.-Sino diplomatic relationship in
decades past had been marred by such popular uprisings in China as the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and
persistent underground resistance to perceived American imperialism, relations between the two
nations remained friendly, if strained, though the closing years of the second world war.
By the time of Richard Nixon's election to the U.S. Senate in 1950. Communist forces in China
had triumphed, pushing Chiang's forces to the offshore island of Formosa and producing a
tremendous controversy within America and its government over who had “lost " China. On January
12. 1950. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a speech before the National Press Club in
Washington, entitled “Crisis in China.” defending the Truman administration’s past actions in Asia.
Acheson declared that the U.S. would be prepared to military defend a line that ran from the Aleutian
Islands to Japan, to the Ryukyu Islands and south to the Philippines, but excluding Taiwan and
Korea. Acheson commented that in the event of a military attack on any nation beyond this defense
perimeter, “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the charter of the United Nations.”' Both in the
aftermath of his speech and in years to come. Acheson was criticized for apparently encouraging
6
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Communists to believe that either Korea or Taiwan could be attacked with relative impunity, as
neither

was

mentioned

as

an

American

military

protectorate

in

his

speech..

In the next few months of 1950. Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R- Wisconsin) began his paranoiac
reign in the public eye by leveling charges that the U.S. State Department was riddled with
Communist sympathizers with questionable loyalties to the United States. On Feb. 9. McCarthy, in a
speech in Wheeling. W. Va., charged that 205 communists were working in the department, a charge
that the State Department denied. " Soon expanding his targets to Ambassadors, university professors
and even Gen. George Marshall. McCarthy’s fear mongering sparked a phenomenon of heightened
domestic paranoia about domestic communist infiltration that reached fever pitch and provided a
platform for ambitious politicians such as Nixon to express outspoken pro-Americanism for political
advantage, no matter the damage incurred to an opponent’s reputation or career. Writing in his work
Senator Joe McCarthv. Richard H. Rovere described McCarthyism as a by-product of the Cold War
and a movement supported by certain vested interest elements and a popular revolt against the upper
classes. Rovere quoted noted sociologist Talcott Parsons as labeling McCarthyism as a “revenge of the
outsiders.” a role that the young Richard Nixon would fit perfectly.^
During this era. lasting from 1950 until McCarthy’s censuring by the full U.S. Senate in 1954.
politicians such as Helen Gahagan Douglas, with even the slightest appearance of sympathy towards
China, real or perceived, were susceptible to vicious political partisan attacks on their voting records
that more often than not resulted in the end of their public service careers. McCarthy’s vendetta
against the State Department in the wake of the Commiuiist triumph in China targeted practically all
experienced sinologists within that agency, forcing many of them to resign and draining the
government of its expertise on dealing with China. Before serving as vice-president in the
Eisenhower White House. Representative Nixon had jumped upon the McCarthy bandwagon, stating
in a speech to the House in early 1950 that the nation was in the grips of a large Communist
conspiracy designed to alter U.S. foreign affairs. “The great lesson to be learned is that we are not just
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dealing with espionage agents who set thirty pieces of silver to obtain the blueprints of a new
weapon,” Nixon explained. “This is a far more sinister type of activity, because it permits the enemy
to guide and shape our policy.^
At the heart of Nixon’s anti-Communism. formed largely during the McCarthy era, was his
personal alarm over what he believed to be the penetration of American institutions such as the State
DepartmenL federal law enforcement agencies and the media by domestic Communists promoting a
radical political and economic agenda. Hailing from a middle-class. White Anglo Saxon Protestant
background. Nixon had a natural reverence for traditional institutions, and was alarmed at what he
perceived to be unchecked infiltration into various agencies by anti-American radicals. McCarthyites
and McCarthy sympathizers believed that Communist influence was pervading America stealthily
and subtly by anti-American propaganda spread by front groups, opinions that undermined the U.S.
ability to be aggressive against its enemy, the U.S.S.R. A Naval veteran of World War II. Nixon’s
patriotism was also offended by the communist phenomenon. At a deeper level, he held an
unshakable conviction that pro-American patriotism was at the core of every moral personality, so
those who held even vaguely unpatriotic sentiment must have been automatically suspect to Nixon. ^
Though Nixon never came out in total support of McCarthy, his rhetoric during that era
closely reflected McCarthyite sentiment and was used to smear political enemies. As Eisenhower’s
designated attacker during the 1952 presidential campaign. Nixon took aim at Democratic nominee
Adlai Stevenson, calling him “an appeascr . with a Ph D. from Dean Acheson’s cowardly college of
Communist contaimnent

Statements such as this bolstered Nixon’s status as not only a staunch

anti-Communist. but also as an aggressive campaigner who was willing to bum bridges in the pursuit
of national office.
In the early morning of June 25. 1950. over 75.000 North Korean troops poured across the
38th parallel in an invasion of South Korea that would subsequently change the tide of American
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sentiment towards China from ally to enemy, as Chinese voltmtecrs joined North Korean regulars
against American G.I.’s. Two days later, Jime 27. President Truman ordered U.S. air and naval forces
in the Far East to the aid of South Korea, and ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any preemptive attack
on Taiwan Iw Mainland forces. Shortly after these orders the first U.S. land troops entered South
Korea from Japan, and the United Nations voted to appoint General Douglas McArthur as U.N.
commander in Korea. The first American armed forces in Korea were attacked by the Chinese
Communists on November 2. 1950. resulting in reversal of fortune for U.S. troops that the New York
Times described as “ominous.” The Times went on to describe the disaster befalling overwhelmed
U.S. forces:
Reinforced by Chinese Communist troops... the beaten North Koreans
...have so successfully ambused parts of one American regiment that
rescue efforts had to be abandoned and the men involved bad to be
told to save themselves as best they could- which meant leaving the
wounded to a horrible fate.
A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed by the U.S. Republic of China soon followed.
whereby America would provide the Nationalists with war material in case they were attacked by the
Communists. The agreement infurirated the Communist Chinese, and went far to harden antiAmerican sentiment on the mainland. This defensive stance became the status quo of U.S. policy
toward China until relations between America and Mainland China began to thaw during the Nixon
era. By the end of 1953. 142.277 Americans had died in Korea.*
Upon Dwight Eisenhower’s election to the presidency in 1952. the U.S. anti-Communist
policy became even more rigid than that of the Truman administration. This was also the John Foster
Dulles era. lasting imtil 1959. during which Eisenhower’s Secretary of State maintained a hard-line
position against any concessions to Communist China, or for that matter, any potential thaw in
relations. In his February 2.1953 State of the Union Message, President Eisenhower declared that the
U.S. Seventh Fleet would no longer shield Nationalists on Formosa from any potential Communist
attack.* This statement was actually psychological warfare against the Communists, with the
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implication that America would no longer hold back Chiang BCai-shek from invading the mainland
while Chinese troops were committed to the war in Korea. Though Eisenhower would not commit
U.S. forces in the area to take part in aggression against the mainland, he nevertheless had sent the
message that America would not protect Communists fighting it in Korea. The message was well
received by the American public, and Eisenhower was praised by the Los Angeles Times for
identifying Communism as an unquestioned world aggressor that the U.S. would stand up against:
At the outset of his message, the President made clear that this nation
does not propose to live any longer in a posture of paralyzed tension,
leaving forever to the aggressor . to cause great hurt to us. ..Few
Presidents havae ever set forth so lucidly a line of policy, foreign and
domestic, in their first appearance before or message to Congress."’
Sino-American relations of the 1950s were extremely tense, and the decade was dominated
by two crises over the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu, strategically located in the Taiwan Strait
but claimed by both the Communist Chinese and the exiled Nationalists. During the summer of 1954.
the mainland government launched a campaign to liberate Taiwan, building up coastal defenses and
mobilizing over two million citizens for militia duty. On August 26. 1954. Communist Chinese troops
began a bombardment of Quemoy. creating a scenario of potential intervention for Eisenhower that
could well have escalated into a Third World War." The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Eisenhower
that the loss of Quemoy would have a devastating psychological impact on Taiwan and create a huge
outcry domestically. Rather than risk massive American intervention that would have resulted in
casualties and a role in helping the Nationalists bomb the mainland. Eisenhower chose the option of
restraint. The Commimists ceased their campaign against Quemoy after a few tense days, and on
April 24. 1955. China Premier Zhou Enlai was quoted in the New York Times as agreeable to begin
negotiations with the U.S. over the Taiwan issue:
The Chinese people are friendly to the American people.
The Chinese people do not want to have war with the
U.S. A The Chinese govenunent is willing to sit down
and enter into negotiations with the U.S. govenunent to
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discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East
and especially the question of relaxing tension in the
Taiwan area.'*
The year 1954 witnessed not only the Geneva Conference that brought a truce to Korea, but
increased American aid to the French in Indochina, an ominous foreshadowing of U.S. involvement
in Southeast Asia during the next decade that cost thousands more American lives and strained U.S.Sino relations even further. When the French fort of Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7. the stage was set
for not only the entrance of U.S. military “advisors” into Southeast Asia, but the suddenly pressing
need for a collective defense treaty in Asia that would hopefully stem the tide of Communist
aggression in the region. On September 8. the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was
sponsored by the United States and signed by eight nations in Manila, including Australia. Britain.
France. New Zealand. Pakistait the Philippines, the U.S. and Thailand. The states pledged them
selves to joint measures of defense against aggression in the area (Southeast Asia), and the agreement
was hailed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as an “Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.”'^ The creation
of SEATO served as a hedge against potential Chinese and Soviet aggression in Southeast Asia, and
was a forenmner of the central principle of the Nixon Doctrine- a collective defense apparatus with
self-defense against Communist agression at its core, ultimately backed up, if necessary Iw U S mili
tary force.
In 1958 a second crisis over the island of Quemoy erupted, as on August 23. Chinese
Communists shelled the island and set up a naval blockade to cut it off from all supplies. This time
the stakes were higher than the first attack in 1954, as Eisenhower armounced on Sept. 4 that the U.S.
would use force against the Communist mainland if a physical invasion of Quemoy was attempted.
Dulles and Vice-President Nixon concurred, and the prospect of war with China was suddenly very
real.'’* The Communist attack had in large measine been provoked by a large deployment of
Nationalist troops on C^emoy by Chiang Kai-shek, an obvious provocation done with the assumption
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that the U.S. would automatically defend Taiwan in the case of an outbreak of war. Responding to
popular domestic pressure to refrain from intervention on behalf of Taiwan in the Quemoy crisis.
Dulles told a press conference on Sept. 30 that the U.S. had “no legal commitment” to defend the
islands, and it had been rather “foolish” of Chiang to put such a large force on the island in th first
place.T his shift in U.S. position was not a softening of position, but was instead aimed at achieving
a cease-fire with the Communists similar to the conclusion of the 1954 crisis. On October 2. 1958. the
New York Times editorialized that while the Communists were not appeased bv U.S. restraint
The pity is that this more flexible policy was not adopted long before
the Chinese Communists attack could put is in our present dilemma.
President Eisenhower himself now says the offshore islands as such
are not vital to the defense of Taiwan...Secretary Dulles ...goes so
far as to call the Nationalist move ’rather foolish ... then it was also
'rather foolish' to expose the United States to the risks now involved
in defending these islands.'®

During the 1960 presidential electioiu Quemoy and Matsu became major issues of contention
between candidates Richard Nixon and John KennetN. Addressed during the television debates of
1960 that marked the turning point of Nixon's campaign against Keimedy . the islands became the
focal point of each candidate's stand on when the United States should intervene militarily abroad in
the fight against Communism. The second debate. October 7. 1960 was centered on foreign affairs.
When asked about the Quemoy-Matsu controversy. Keimedy answered that the islands were
strategically indefensible, and that "this country has never made a flat commitment to defend them."
Only in the case of an overall Commimist attack on Taiwan would KennetN defend the islands, but
othenvise. the risk of war over a “hazy” defense line was not worth a major loss of American lives. '
Kennedy did not advocate backing down against the Communist Chinese, but his pragmatism called
for negotiation versus automatic counter-aggression.
In contrast. Nixon emphatically supported defense of the islands at virtually any cost casting
them as symbols of America’s overall commitment to containing communism. His response to the
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issue epitomized his prc-presidcntial view of America's anti-Communist efforts, and sought to cast
Keimecfy as soft on communism for suggesting that the islands were not worth defending “It's the
principle that coimts.” said Nixon. “The islands are an area of freedom and we should not force our
Nationalist allies to get off of them.” Labeling Kermetfy’s thinking as “woolly,” Nixon said that he
“would never tolerate it as president.”'*
For Nixon, it appeared that his vigorous stand in favor of defending Quemoy and Matsu at
practically all costs went too far for mainstream America, just as Barry Goldwater's hawkish stances
in 1964 alienated many voters of both parties. On Oct. 27. 1960. the New York Times endorsed John
F. Kcnnecfy for the presidency, citing Nixon's opinions on the two islands as examples of apparently
questionable judgment. The Times editorial board lamented the fact that Quemoy and Matsu
dominated the foreign policy debate, but supported Ketmetfy's statement that he would not go to war
with Communist China over the principle of defending two tiny islands. However, the Times
criticized Nixon for his alleged oversimplicity on the issue;
There are large areas of the world—particularly in Southeastern Asia—
where ideological conflict between communism and anti-communism
may break out at any moment into local warfare. Are we. as Mr. Nixon
indicates, to use American manpower to prev ent the loss of one inch
of free territory' in such areas? The choice is not so easy as Mr. Nixon
implies...It involves the question of...the possible cost of American
intervention in terms of American lives. The oversimplification of
Mr. Nixon's sweeping declarations in these matters is not reassuring.'®
Nixon went on to lose the election by the closest margin in presidential election history, and went
back to life as a private citizen still as anti-Communist as he had been during the 1950s imder
Eisenhower.
The decade of the 1960s leading to Nixon's first term contained no significant change in
U.S.-Sino relations, as the war in Vietnam kept the two nations at perpetual odds and wary of each
other’s motives. President Keimetfy was optimistic about the future relations, but remained wary as
memories of the Quemoy-Matsu crises of the 1950s were still fresh. En route to Vierma on Jimc 2.
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1961 to meet Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Kennec^ was asked at a Paris news conference how
Communist China could achieve normalized relations with the West. He replied:
We desire peace and we desire to live in amity with the Chinese people.
But I will say that since long before I assumed office...the attacks on
our Government and the United States were constant, immediate, and
in many cases malevolent... We want goodwill. But it takes two to make
peace, and I am hopeful that a peaceful existence with its neighbors
represents the best hope for us all. We would welcome it...*®
His administration cut short by an assassin's bullet. KermcrN's successor. Lyndon Johnson.
maintained Kennedy's stance that a change in the nature of U.S.-Sino relations would depend on
steps taken by the Communists. Early in his first term. April 20. 1964. President Johnson told an
Associated Press limcheon in New York that America would stand strong against China as long as
the Communists remained dogmatic in their approach towards the U.S.:
So long as the Communist Chinese pursue conflict and preach violence,
there can be and will be no easing of relationships. There are some who
prophesy that these policies will change. But America must base our
acts on present realities and not on future hopes. It is not we who must
re-examine our view of China. It is the Chinese Communists who must
re-examine their view of the world."'
As Johnson's term progressed and the United States was dragged deeper and deeper into a
losing effort in the Vietnam War. the Chinese became more powerful militarily and at the same time
slid towards social anarchy as the Cultural Revolution turned into an internal Chinese disaster. On
Jime 16. a paranoid Chinese Foreign Ministry declared that foreign journalists gaining information
from wall posters or Chinese newspapers would officially be accused of spying: the next day. China
exploded its first hydrogen bomb, drawing international attention to its rapidly growing nuclear
weapons progam. “ By the end of 1967. Lyndon Johson would announce that he would neither seek
nor accept a presidential term, and Richard Nixon would come to the realization that to end the war
in Southeast Asia. Commimist China would have to be brought back into the community of nations.
Elected to the presidency on Nov. 6. 1968 and inaugurated Jan. 20. 1969, Richard Nixon
dropped a major hint of his impending China policy change during his inaugural speech, in which he
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declared that “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.”^ Immediately
after taking office. Nixon ordered National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to re-examine U.S.
policy toward China, as his rapprochement policy slowly began to be formulated within the Oval
Office and away from the State Department. In the first few months of Nixon’s term, deteriorating
relations between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. accelerated, as from March 3 to March 7 an
estimated 260 million people participated in anti-Soviet demonstrations throughout China. In Peking,
the Soviet Embassy was placed under siege by demonstrators.'^
Later in 1969 Soviet-Sino border clashes intensified, as their schism began to take
precedence over adversarial relations with the West. On June 8. President Nixon armounced the
phased withdrawal of 25.000 American troops from Vietnam, predicating further troop reduction on
future decison-making. ^ The combination of deepening Sino-Soviet problems and the beginning of a
pull-out from Vietnam made U.S. detente with China more inevitable, as a historic window of
opportunity was opening for Nixon to take advantage of. Detente overtures, though still in the
plaiming stage, would take advantage of Soviet preoccupation with China to pressure them to not
only isolate Hanoi and hopefully hasten the end of the war in Vietnam, but also send the Communist
Chinese the message that the U.S. had limited interests in Southeast Asia beyond existing treaties and
wanted to prevent future Soviet aggression in the area.
Thus, by July 15. 1971. the day Nixon armounced to America that he would visit Communist
China, the time was strategically right for detente overtures. If successful, a detente initiative would
achieve three foreign policy goals simultaneously; exploitation of the Sino-Soviet schism to gain
diplomatic leverage against the Soviet Union (applicable to arms control talks and containment of
Third World communist insurgencies), isolation of Hanoi and a rapidly negotiated settlement of the
war in Vietnam, as well as the creation of an atmosphere conducive to implementing the Nixon
Doctrine of regional secmity pacts and decreased U.S. world policing responsibilities.
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An Enigmatic Political Ascendancy

Judging from his hard-line. anti-Communist rhetoric as a congressional candidate and
the law-and-order image he created as president, Richard Nixon appeared to the American public as a
true Republican conservative. Nixon employed venomous smear tactics and charges of Communist
sympathies to defeat Jerry Voorhis for the 12th California Congressional District seat in 1946. giving
him instant notoriety on Capitol Hill as an aggressive right-wing Republican. Later involvement with
the House Un-American Committee and his major role in the Alger Hiss peijury hearings enhanced
and nationalized Nixon's conservative Republican status, as did his rabid anti-Communist statements
and extreme positions in his 1948 rcelection bid and 1950 Senate campaign. To President Dwight
Eisenhower's Eastern Establishment supporters. Senator Nixon must have appeared as an ideal
choice to be the general's vice-presidential running mate in 1952; Nixon's outspoken conservatism
pleased the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, adding balance to Eisenhower’s moderation
on the ticket
Coming as he did with such a reputation for conservatism and right-leaning domestic policy
positions. President Richard Nixon in 1972 shocked Republicans when he made official détente
overtures to Communist China. It seemed to contradict not only Nixon's years of rigid antiCommunism. but his Republican credentials as well. Though his decision to informally recognize
Communist China was in fact a pragmatic necessity, it nevertheless belied the principles of the core
right wing faction of the Republican Party which contributed heavily but warily to Nixon's election to
the presidency in 1968.
Although any Democratic president's attempt to reach out to Commimist China would have been
virtually impossible during the Cold War era of the early 1970s. Nixon risked alienating a significant
17
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and wealthy minority of his own party Iw appearing to placate the Communist Chinese. However,
significant foreign policy experience, respect from his “Silent Majority” of Americans in that area,
and the fact that his traditional image as a staunch conservative made Nixon's move acceptable, and
even welcomed, in the United States. Therein lies the political contradiction of his decision to
recognize Communist China. Why would Nixon believe he could pull off Chinese detente without
seriously risking his voter and financial bases for his 1972 reelection campaign? What domestic
political dynamics drove his decision, and how did these forces propel him into the presidency in
1968? Perhaps most fundamentally, despite years of conservative postiuing and heated anti
communist rhetoric, was Nixon actually as conser\ative as the image he projected? The answers to
questions such as these reveal much about the inner and outer political personas of Richard Nixon
and provide an insight into his decision to recognize Communist China.

Congressman Nixon: True Conservative or Pragmatic Politician?

Though raised during childhood in an Orange County. California. Republican household and
naturally inclined as a young man towards that part}', it cannot be assumed that fledgling
congressional candidate Nixon, if left to his own devices, would have chosen the path of antiCommunist smear tactics and relentless attack campaigning to capture a House seat in 1946. A great
admirer of Woodrow Wilson, a liberal Democratic with internationalist philosophies. Nixon believed
to a large degree that great things could be accomplished through progressive activism, particularly
on a global scale.' According to A. James Reichley. the early Nixon appears to have been inclined
toward a moderate liberal position. His first political hero was his father’s old favorite, progressive
Wisconsin Gov. Robert La Follette. Anything but a slash-and-bum conservative during his early
private citizen years, Nixon was relatively left of center in the Republican ideological spectrum."
Nixon was. though, from early in his career a political animal, adapting to the post-World War II
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Cold War era with hard-line anti-Communism and later, tough pro-law enforcement rhetoric directed
at urban criminals and anti-war protesters.^ His pragmatic a{q>roach later went beyond domestic
politics and manifested itself in the foreign policy arena, appearing prominently in the China
initiative and its sensitive political nature.
Set against Nixon’s moderate background was the entrance of Murray Chotiner into his
1946 congressional campaign— one of the defining moments of the candidate’s shift to serious
conservatism. A Southern California lawyer embarking upon a new career as a campaign strategist
Chotiner set Nixon upon a path of overt aggression and could well have been the main catalyst in
Nixon’s pragmatic shift to the right in his quest to capture national office.'* Rurming in an era of
heightened suspicions of domestic Communism and Republican outcries against alleged national
security lapses within Truman’s State Department Nixon adopted Chotiner’s campaign philosophy of
wiiming no matter what the cost to his opponent;
Chotiner’s message—as it was to young candidate Nixon in 1946—is
“attack.”...Chotiner’s presence in the campaign in the 12th district in
1946 may have been overkill. There is evidence enough that the young
Nixon., had enough Chotiner in him to win without the master.^
The young Nixon’s attacks on his opponents, accusing them of un-American sympathies
without possessing deep and genuine anti-Soviet or anti-Chinese sentiment himself, clearly surfaced
during the 1946 Nixon-Jeny Voorhis campaign. Prior to that campaign, Nixon’s views were
tempered with the kind of progressive idealism advocated ly heroes such as Woodrow Wilson, such
as American leadership of the world and mobilization of the power of government to ameliorate
societal ills. However, post-1946 Nixonian rhetorie was rigidly conservative and Republican,
especially on Communism and domestic order, especially during the heat of campaigns. How did
Nixon’s strident conservatism reconcile with his irmate pragmatism, particularly diuing his
congressional years?
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Observers such as Bruce Mazlish. a Nixon era observer who wrote a psycho-historical
interpretation of the president, concluded that Nixon’s conception of national interest bridged that
ideological gap and allowed him to take positions that were consistent with the overall welfare of the
U.S.. even if they contradicted his personal views. “Like most politicians, only more so. Nixon
believed in his mission and identified his own self and fortunes with the success of his country. It is
part of the secret of his political success, since the total belief in himself is a means by which a
politician convinces others to believe in him.”®Nixon’s political strategy of publicly espousing strict
conservatism while privately remaining relatively moderate helps to not only explain the right wing’s
later distrust of him. but ironically, the very trust put in him by the American people when he
established relations with China and arms control measures with the U.S.S.R. In the case of Nixon,
dismantling Jerry Voorhis and his smear-filled attacks on Helen Gahagan Douglas in the 1950
California senatorial race were merely hurdles to clear in his effort to influence U.S. foreign policy
through his own brand of natural moderation and pragmatic reaction to international conditions.

Nixon’s Destruction of Helen Gahagan Douglas
Though Nixon’s defeat of Voorhis set the tone for his anti-Communist image and aggressive
campaigning style, his 1950 quest for the U.S. Senate against Helen Gahagan Douglas cemented
Nixon’s conservative credentials and moved him closer to national office. By the time tlie race was
over his attack style and personal boldness reinforced his “true” Republicanism to the public and
earned the lasting eminity of America’s liberal establishment. However, in light of Nixon’s later
political pragmatism while president and his penchant for opportunism, it is just as likely that
viciously impugning Douglas’ character and her congressional voting record was Nixon’s method of
reaching the Senate rather than truly embracing the conservative GOP cause.
A respected legislator. Douglas was at one point voted by the Washington press corps as the
second most outstanding Western representative in the 79th Congress, as well as listed as one of the
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“twelve smartest women in the world” by the Book of Knowledge. However, her strong support of
civil rights, marriage to the Je^vish actor Melvyn Douglas and skeptical approach to domestic
Communist hysteria made her an aRxaling target to both the California and national GOP parties—
to say nothing of her outspoken opposition to the House Un-American Committee, one which sat her
opponent, freshman Congressman Richard Nixon. Though in 1946 Douglas condemned the Soviet
Union as “the cruelest most barbaric autocracy in world history.. .” statemenets such as “1 think we
all know that communism is no real threat to the democratic institutions of this country” left her
vulnerable to Nixon’s aggressive campaigning style.*
Nixon recognized Helen Douglas as a formidable ORXment both in terms of her striking
personal presence as well as her large degree of influence within the California entertaiiunent
industry. However, in his memoirs. Nixon characterized Douglas as a legislator without strong
personal support in the House and implied that he did the U.S. Congress a favor by rurming an
aggressive campaign against her:
Mrs. Douglas was a handsome woman with a dramatic presence, .but she
was not, to put it mildly, the most popular member of the House of Rep
resentatives. Generally when two members of the House run against each
other for another office their fellow congressmen maintain a friendly
attitude and wish both of them well. But in our case, even may of the
House Democrats let me know that they hoped I could defeat Helen Douglas.^
Referring to Douglas as “one of the most left wing members of Congress—and a woman.” Nixon’s
strategy was to emphasize ‘ her extremist record” and let the voters decide who was more proAmerican.'” This tactic epitomized Nixon’s early approach to campaigning before he served as
president: combine his own hyper-patriotism with attacks on his opponent’s voting record. Although
he used it effectively to sway public opinion, it was not a true barometer of is conservatism. Rather, it
appeared to be pure politics, designed solely to elevate Nixon to a level at which he could pursue his
passion, foreign policy.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

22

It was during the campaign that Nixon’s nationalism began to replace his Republican
conservatism. Though the most memorable tactic Nixon employed was pubic comparison of Helen
Douglas’ voting record to that of Congressman Vito Marcantonio of New York, the lone openly
Communist representative in the House, his tactics also included catchy slogans such as labeling
Douglas as the "Pink Lacfy.” and self-promotion as a man always on guard against Communist
agitators. Though Nixon won his seat in the Senate by a margin of 680.000 votes, the results of his
ostentatious display of overt flag-waving and personal attacks were mixed."

Nixon s relentless

attacks on Helen Douglas and his McCarthy-like use of the "Communist” label alienated many
influential figures within the Washington. D C., political establishment, including leading Democrats
who despised Nixon for his brand of attack politics.'"

Senate and Vice-Presidencv Years: Moving Toward the Center

Between 1951 and 1960 Nixon slowly shifted towards the ideological center of the
Republican spectrum, voting against his party’s isolationist sentiment towards Europe and for
increased foreign economic aid. Nixon still traveled the nation and campaigned vigorously for
Republican House and Senate candidates who sought the endorsement of the nation’s most prominent
neo-conservative, but his stance on many congressional bills began to deviate from his America-first
image. During his two years as U.S. Senator. Nixon became more of an internationalist, as political
historian A.James Reichley observed:
In his two years in the Senate (1951 -1953), Nixon’s voting record closely
resembled that of his California colleague. William Knowland. later iden
tified as an extreme conservative, but then very much under the moderate
influence of Governor Warren. ..On foreign policy issues Nixon often voted
with a handful of Republican internationalists, such as Henry Cabot Lodge
of Massachusetts and Irving Ives of New York, rather than the neo-isolationist
bloc ledby Taft.'^
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Having attained national office. Nixon a^xtrentlv felt he could begin to be more pragmatic in foreign
affairs. This is not to imply, however, that his philosophy towards communism, especially Communist
China, had softened. If anything, his eminity toward China had hardened after Peking’s intervention
in the Korean War. "Thousands of American boys are dead because the Communist Chinese
supported the attack on South Korea.” Nixon wrote in a U.S. News & World Report documented
address. September 9. 1955. "Korea is divided today because the Communist Chinese refuse to agree
to free elections. ” he continued. "They encourage, incite and support insurrection, rebellion and
subversion in every free country of Asia...”'"* Holding fast to the containment strategy of the
Eisenhower administration formulated by George Kennan . Nixon opposed China's admittance to the
United Nations as long as it remained an "outlaw nation.” violating the principles of the world
diplomatic community.'■
By the end of the 1950s. Richard Nixon’s ideological stance within the Republican Party was
ambiguous at best as his support for U.S. financial and military intervention in Europe and Southeast
Asia and furtive support for domestic civil rights combined with an unwavering stand against
communist nations such as China. This "mixed political legacy” alienated stalwart Republicans from
the prospect of a Nixon presidency in 1960. but his activism and moderate domestic views enhanced
his standing with middle-of-the-road Republicans looking for a continuation of the Eisenhower
administration’s steady course.'® Nixon seemed to apply conservative methods to achieving moderate
goals, always with the animus of politics in the background. Though it was necessary to adopt such as
stance as vice-president in a moderate Republican administration, historians such as Mary C.
Brennan view Nixon’s maneuvering as purely politics;
The confusion surrounding Nixon’s political ideology resulted in part from
a deliberate policy implemented by the candidate himself. At heart a centrist
Nixon usually occupied the middle ground.. As a govenunent official. Nixon
believed in finding workable solutions, a practice that generally required
compromise and concession. As a politician, he followed a path that would
give him the most votes. ' '
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Approaching the presidential election of 1960. Richard Nixon’s experience in the Eisenhower
administration positioned him as a Republican centrist but to the public, his arch-conservative image
largely endured because of his refusal to back down to Communist leaders such as Khrushchev and
Mao. as well as his HUAC fame. The global menace of communism remained a potent political issue
for the confirmed pro-American.

The Specter of Barrv Goldwater

The meteoric rise of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater through the Republican ranks to
leadership in the late 1950s was due not only to his foreign policy hawkishness and outspoken
conservatism, but also to a steadily growing revolt at the GOP state and local levels against the
perception of Richard Nixon as a closet liberal. In 1960 this trend was observed by the fledgling
national conservative press. William F. Buckley’s influential National Review. Reporting on April 9.
1960 that "There are mounting within the Republican Party pressures against Mr. Nixon’s attempt to
Liberalize the part) in time for the national election. ” the Review supported Goldwater early on and
svmbolized conservative intellectual opposition to Nixon.'* Enthusiastc editorializing for Goldwater
against Nixon in the National Review and the ultra-conservative Human Events magazine broadened
on opening schism within the GOP.
In a larger sense, support for Goldwater by young members of the Republican Party and the
national conservative press represented disenchantment with not only Nixon’s centrist stance, but
with the man himself. Tired of Eisenhower’s "dime store New Deal” policies, conservatives yearned
for a candidate who would vigorously oppose further extension of the welfare state. Not entirely
trusting of Nixon, the growing GOP conservative youth brigade, epitomized by the Young Americans
for Freedom, threw its support behind Goldwater in what amounted to a stark repudiation of Nixon’s
eight years as a moderate vice-president. "It was Goldwater. not Nixon or Eisenhower, who was the
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hero of the bright and dominant forces at the Chicago convention.” Buckely asserted. "Youth was
everywhere at the Republican convcntioiu and the ones who will be working hardest to guide the
Republican Party in the future were conservatives; and most of them Goldwater fans.”'”
Nixon realized that he would still need conservatives support to win the presictencv'. but it
was doubtful that a disclosure of his plans to pursue peace-oriented diplomacy with any Communist
nation would have gained him much stalwart Republican support. In the early 1960s. conservatives.
especially Southerners and wealthy right-wingers, supported Goldwater's policies of direct
confrontation with the Communist bloc in the Cold War. withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from
all Communist nations and the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort to protect free nations from
hostile communist aggression."® Barry Goldwater’s stature within the GOP grew tremendously after
John F. Kermcdy defeated Nixon in 1960. Goldwater’s popularity contrasted with Nixon’s image as a
"loser” and a compromiser on conservative issues. To Mary Brennaru Nixon’s defeat at the hands of
an East Coast liberal Democrat infuriated conservative stalwarts who saw through the apparent
conservative transparency of Richard Nixon;
Conservatives, frustrated by Nixon’s narrow defeat in the election of 1960 and
still angry at what they saw as his turn toward liberalism, lashed out. In a letter
to the National Review, a reader voiced his disgust that Nixon had given up
his advantages by trying to simply outpromise Kermetk. The journal’s editors
agreed that Nixon had surrendered the ideological high ground to appear more
like his opponent and chastised him for leaving no legacy but merely the memory
of his defeat."'

Barry Goldwater’s nomination in 1964 represented a high-water mark for the GOP conservative
faction on the national level, as their delegates rejected both Nixon and the liberalism of New York’s
Nelson Rockefeller. Nixon’s loss to Edmund Brown in the 1962 California gubernatorial race, his
decision not to seek the GOP presidential nomination in 1964 and the subsequent Democratic victory
had all the appearances of dooming Richard NLxoiu but events turned out to have been a personal
boon for him and Republican moderates.
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The deathknell to Goldwater’s presidential campaign and perhaps to right-wing dominance
of the Republican Party in the early 1960s came during his nomination acceptance speech at the 1964
GOP Convention in San Francisco’s Cow Palace." With the phrase. "Extremism in defense of liberty
is no vice. Moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue.” the figurehead of neo-conservative
resurgence had ventured too far into the fringe of Republican politics for most Americans."'^ Though
his resounding defeat was disastrous to the Republican Party, for Richard Nixon it opened the
possibility of a compromise presidential nomination in 1968. Nixon, always the Party man. was
disappointed with Goldwater’s nomination, but stumped for him nevertheless:
It was fhistrating to me to see as inept candidate as Goldwater running for
President. It was especially heartbreaking because Republican voters seemed
to be interested in the campaign that year ..But time after time the senatorial
or congressional candidate ...begged me to avoid associating his candidacy
with Goldwater . in every speech I gave my personal support for Goldwater.
I made over 150 appearances in thirty-six states. But it was a hopeless task.
From the time the campaign began 1 knew that we were going to lose heavily.'^
Barry Goldwater’s nomination in 1964 represented a high-water mark for the GOP
conservative faction on the national level, as their delegates rejected both Nixon and the liberalism of
New York’s Nelson Rockefeller. Nixon’s loss to Edmund Brown in the 1962 California gubernatorial
race, his decision not to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1964 and the subsequent
Democratic victory had all the appearances of dooming Richard Nixon’s political career, but events
turned out to have been a personal boon for him and GOP moderates.

The Dual Foreign Policv Conservatism of Citizen Nixon

The interim years of 1964-1%8 afforded Nixon the opportunity to travel around the globe on
fact-finding missions and to traverse the United States giving speeches for private groups and the
Republican Party. Nixon spoke out against possible accommodation with the Soviets and Communist
Chinese to assuage conservatives of his hard-line position regarding communism. Not as hawkish as
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Goldwater but confrontational nonetheless, private citizen Nixon was willing to escalate the war in
Vietnam in 1965 at the risk of antagonizing China. In a speech to the Sales Executive Club of New
York. January 26. 1965. Nixon "stated bluntly” that the war was being lost and "urged that we take
the war to North Vietnam by naval and air bombing of the Communists' suf^ly routes in South
Vietnam and by destroying the Vietcong staging areas in North Vietnam and Laos.”^
At this point in Nixon's political career, confrontation with Communist China was an
ultimately acceptable option for winning the Vietnam War. Drawing distinction between himself and
the GOP’s right-wing, he stated that he would endorse an escalation of bombing but not the nuclear
option. “Unlike some extremist hawks. 1 did not think that we should use nuclear weapons in
Vietnam...! said that we should instead quarantine the war in Vietnam by using our air and sea
power...! was aware that this policy would risk involving Red China...”"® So. Nixon appeared to be
tilting back towards overt aggressiveness a full two years before the 1968 presidential election,
shoring his right flank with firm stances on winning Vietnam and refusing to back down to
Communists in Asia.
At the same time Nixon was mollifying his critics in the area of foreign policy he was
advocating philosophical centrism as the unifier of a factionalized Republican Party."

His dual

conservatism satisfied a large part of the mid-1960s GOP. with exceptions being Rockefeller liberals
and what remained of Goldwaterites. neither of which had supported Nixon in 1960. In his memoirs.
Nixon wrote of his use of political dualism to unite the party behind himself and the ideological
center:
In a number of speeches before 1965.1 urged my audiences to be Lincoln
Republicans: liberal in their concern for people and conservative in their
respect for the rule of law. 1deliberately used the terms liberal and conserx ative. which in 1964 had been the sorrow of the party ..1 said. if being
a liberal means federalizing everything, then I’m no liberal. If being a
conservative means turning back the clock... then I’m no conservative.^
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The year 1967 marked a watershed for both the Republican Party and Richard Nixon: it was
then that the party recognized the need to nominate a moderate for president. The year also witnessed
a significant change in Nixon’s policy toward Communist nations such as China. In April. 1967.
Nixon embarked on a tour of Asia that significantly altered his world view of communism. The trip
not only enhanced his credentials as the foreign policy spokesman of the Republican Party, but also
exposed him to the growing reality of Communist China’s immense power and influence in the
region that sho^ved no sign of abatement. He later noted that:
Every leader 1talked to in Asia expressed support for a strong American
position in Vietnam. But 1also found on the trip a growing concern about
Communist China. Some who had adamantly opposed any change of
American policy toward China had come around to the view that some new
and direct relationship between the two nations was essential if there was
was to be any chance at all after Vietnam was over to build a lasting peace
in Asia in which flee nations would have a chance to survive.^
Leaders seeking a new American policy toward China included Prince Norodom Sihnouk of
Cambodia, a neutral nation bordering Vietnam that had alrcacfy been infiltrated by Vietcong forces
and would ultimately fall to the Communists in the 1970s.
Following this trip Nixon wrote his famous Foreign Affairs article. “Asia After Vietnam.” an
opinion piece in a widely respected and read foreign policy establishment journal which contained the
seeds of a new China policy. The turning point in Nixon’s view of U.S.-China relations, the article
was aimed not only at foreign policy pcrsotmcl but at the American public as well, who wanted a
change in American policy in Asia that was costing thousands of lives. Suggesting that the time was
rapidly approaching to “pull China back into the world community” for the sake of future peace in
Asia and the entire world. Nixon also conceded that nationalistic Communism was different in nature
from the international Communist front.
Implicit was that Communism’s threat to the United States democracy might not be as
serious as he had once believed, and that regional wars of communism versus democratic regimes
were more civil wars than possible falling dominoes.*” Though this modification of Nixon’s anti-
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Communism owed more to prevailing world conditions and the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity
than a personal retreat from ardent hawkishness, in nonetheless represented a significant crack in his
conservative facade. The Foreign Affairs article represented a diriding line between Nixon's old and
new China policies, and suggested that he had the wherewithal to both formulate as well as
implement new policy changes. A legacy emerging alreacN from Vietnam was the future reluctance
of the American people to become involved in Asian land wars, a problem that would have to be
averted by altering U.S. relations with Communist China, the greatest threat to instability in the
region that could potentially lead to further pressure on America to intervene.
If Nixon's flexibility on the China question prompted conservative questioning of his
determination for confronting Communism on the international stage. Republicans were reassured t>y
his continuing support for total victory in Vietnam. Even though growing levels of U.S. troops and
bombing needed for victory potentially could have brought China into the war. Nixon knew that he
could not abandon his conservative stance in the 1968 election. Nixon's hint of eventual detente with
China and simultaneous avocation of increased military pressure on North Vietnam fits into the dual
conservatism model that he had so carefully built in the years leading to the election of 1968. Richard
Nixon particularly needed Southern support to be elected president and to that end a strong stance on
Vietnam could offset the abstractions of future overtures towards the Chinese.*'
To presidential historian Stephen Ambrose. Nixon's strong suRxrt for victory in Vietnam
was a combination of personal philosophy and political strategy. Both unwilling and politically
unable to support the dishonorable peace of a complete American surrender to Communist forces.
Nixon by virtue of default of options staked his future candidacy on defeating communist insurgency:
Perhaps it was a gamble...Ixit Nixon had no choice. His options did not
include taking a cut-and-run position on Vietnam, because his constituents,
especially but by no means exclusively in the South, would have deserted
him in droves. Beyond that factor, he personally was by no means reach' to
give up. His basic position on how to end the war remained unchanged:
send more bombs to Vietnam and more Republicans to Washington.**
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Tempering toughness on Vietnam with pragmatism toward China. Nixon gravitated towards the
foreign policy center as he became more and more confident of retaining the South by gaining the
support of influential GOP Senators Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and John Tower of Texas.
Nixon's "Southern Strategy” began to take shape, enhanced ly his reputation as a hawk on commu
nism and a strong proponent of domestic law and order in an atmosphere of demonstrations,
destructive racial rioting and increasing public fear of crime.** Illustrating the importance of the
South to Richard Nixon in 1968 was the fact that eleven traditional Southern states plus Kentucky
and Oklahoma accounted for 356 delegates in that year, more than half of the 667 that were needed
for the nomination.*'*

1968: A United GOP Forsakes Ideology

After having spent four years walking a political tightrope between moderation and true
conservatism, enduring the label “two-time loser” and tirelessly promoting the GOP. Nixon was
finally elected President of the United States in 1968 as a compromise candidate within his own party .
Though the world “compromise” suggests a weakened position. Nixon's standing in the middle gave
him the leeway needed for the decision to pursue detente with Communist China. Such an initiative
would have undoubtedly been unacceptable to the party as a whole had he been elected on a strictly
liberal or right-wing Republican platform.
Benefiting from Goldwater’s defeat in 1964. Nixon became the leading Republican candidate
in 1968 as conservatives sought a hedge against the liberal wing of their party.** By virtue of having
supported Goldwater and continual efforts to reach common ground with Southern conservatives on
such issues as Vietnam and domestic law and order. Nixon appealed to the Goldwaterites who were
nervous about the possibility of such Republican liberals as George Romney or Nelson Rockefeller
representing the GOP in 1968. According to Garry Wills. Nixon stepped into the leadership vacuum
of the far right thanks to his political staying power:
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In 1965 and 1966. when il looked as if Rockefeller or Romney had the
nomination. Nixon was the only palatable candidate surviving on the
Right...He played this role carefidly. giving and getting support from all
the leaderless Goldwater types still running or maneuvering to run. He
earned their gratitude and prior commitment.*®

Receiving commitments of support from Thurmond and Tower not only helped Nixon carry
the region in 1968. but his Southern strategy was also central to turning back a strong challenge to
his nomination by Ronald Reagan, a new hero to the conservatives after his 1966 election to the
gov ernorship of California. Reagan, an avowed anti-CommiuiisL foe of busing and nationally knowm
actor and politician was an appealing candidate to Southern conservatives searching for an electable
alternative to Nixon.* A strong Reagan showing at the 1968 Republican Convention in Miami could
have derailed Nixon’s nomination by splitting conservative delegates and propelling a liberal, most
likely Rockefeller, to the nomination. Reagaru despite his meteoric rise within the GOP. was not a
direct challenger to Nixon’s ascendancy due to his late start (he declared his candidacy at the
convention), but rather threatened to play the spoiler.
Integral to beating back Reagan's challenge in 1968 was the groundwork Nixon had laid by
modifying his conservatism to attract Southern support. Tough rhetoric and a commitment to winning
the presidency helped the candidate overcome not only conservative Southern reluctance to support a
traditional moderate, but also his image as unelectablc after his 1962 gubernatorial defeat in
California. Nixon's early procurement of Southern conservative endorsements and his long-term
party loyally curbed the late Reagan surge at the Miami convention * An example of Nixon's payolT
at the convention was his victory in Texas, a staunchly conservative stale, which pledged 41 delegates
to Nixon and 15 for Reagan— a feat largely due to Nixon's political alliance with John Tower.**
Nominated for president. Nixon had successfully cleared the hurdles put before him by the
conservative South, in large measure to pledges and promises of continued anti-Communism. This
course of action was of particular importance to Strom Thurmond, an important Nixon supporter
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whose super-patriotism practically superseded his segregationist attitudes. In the aftermath of Nixon's
GOP convention victory, an exchange between the Senator and the nominee vividly illustrated the
hopes of conservatives for Nixon, only later to be disappointed;
Thurmond, for all his anti-civil rights views, had even higher priorities:
“Why Dick, when you're President, all I want is that you never, ever let
let up against them Communists,” said Thurmond. “Senator, you know I
never will.” responded Nixon. “I sure know you won't” answered Thur
mond, pumping the candidate’s hand evidently in the belief that a
solemn bond had been sealed for he sorrowfully reminded Nixon of these
words during his Presidency at the time of the antiballistic missile (ABM)
treaty and the China initiative.^”

Episodes such as this illustrate the paradox between Nixon the conservative Republican
politician and later. Nixon the presidential pragmatist responding flexibly to conditions even if it
meant altering doctrinal U.S. foreign policy. Though he was indeed a conservative at heart regarding
domestic issues and general foreign policy principles as standing up to Communist aggression and
peace with honor in Vietnam, the international relations arena as handled by the president required a
sense of balance and credibility. Despite the lingering mistrust of Reagan supporters during the drive
for the nomination. Nixon's campaign conservatism never faltered and in large measure was carried
over into his administration. Rictiard Nixon's main priority remained the practice of high level
foreign policy, an area which he considered presidential domain and excelled in.
In an interview with U.S. News & World Report before the general election. Nixon told an
interviewer. “1 think the President’s mind and attention must be left clear to deal with those problems
where only he can provide leadership- that is. first in the field of foreign policy, where only he in
some instances can make the great decisions.”'*” This belief in executive control over the nation's
foreign affairs, combined with his intense interest in the subject goes far in explaining his shifting
degrees of conservatism amid party factionalism and national politics.
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Post 1968: Nixonian Conservatism Portends China Recognition

Though Nixon's election was not necessarily a triumph for staunch conservatives, it was
nevertheless a Republican victory. President Nixon's tough public image was bolstered by his choice
of Spiro T. Agnew as vice-president, who subsequently became Nixon's point man for attacking
dissenting intellectuals and the liberal media, a long time nemesis of the new president.^' Attempting
to repay the South for its electoral support, Nixon called for a "moratorium " on court-ordered busing
until July 1. 1973. justifying the move by his personal belief that forced integration busing was the
wrong solution to correct racial imbalances.'** Within his administration, Nixon hired Patrick
Buchanan, an arch-conservative as a speechwriter. and named John Mitchell, a conservative lawyer,
as his Attomq, General.'**
The conservative nature of the Nixon administration on domestic issues created a political
climate that made detente with Communist China acceptable. This would have been impossible for
the Democrats with their traditional reputation for supporting Civil Rights, labor unions and “letting
the dust settle” in China, a phrase uttered by Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the Truman
administration regarding the U.S. role in the outcome of China's civil war. By attempting to combat
social unrest in the nation with tough rhetoric. President Nixon reassured his Silent Majority that he
was a competent leader who deserved their trust in matters of foreign affairs. Thus, most Americans
regarded his visit to China as a tremendous feat of personal diplomacy, and criticism from both the
right and left wings was muted as his political capital for réélection skyxocketed.
Despite the President's appeal to the average Republican, the GOP right-wing was less than
satisfied with Nixon's foreign policy initiatives in the years leading to the China trip.'*'* The proposed
collective regional security organizations and reinforced commitment to communist containment
proposed witfiin the Nixon Doctrine would reduce America's future world policing responsibilities,
while at the same time, maintain a staunch vigilance against foreign aggressors of sovereign nations.
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However, military conservatives worried about Nixon’s tendencies toward détente with the Soviets. In
their eyes, détente with a Communist superpower would be interpreted as a tacit acceptance of that
system, and invite further aggression against weaker nations.**
Ultimately, however. Nixon’s election enthroned moderate conservatism as the prevailing
philosophy of the United States from 1968 to 1972. Finally awarded the presidency by the American
people, Nixon enjoyed a honeymoon period in which he retained relative autonomy in decision
making. until the invasion of Cambodia and other controversial episodes once again limited his
options. His election marked a repudiation of the policies of his two Democratic predecessors and a
national shift towards the right of center. In the wake of his 1968 victory, the National Review
editorialized;
Richard Nixon has. thus, a clear mandate from the nation. And it is a
conservative mandate. Not ‘extreme right wing’ or even clear-cut un
mixed conservatism perhaps, but undeniably from the conservative
side of the spectrum.**
The Los Angeles Times, a newspaper which had endorsed Nixon for the presidency, observed that
Nixon would have a tough time uniting the country due to exetensive national alienation, but
expressed faith that Nixon’s leadership qualities would pave the way for a successful first term;
There is reason for optimism on this score, not only on the
basis of Nixon’s experience but because of his expressed
views on the nature of the Presidency...It won’t be easy for
the President-elect to build the coalition for progress...but
he deserves the help of all of us in making the effort.*
The Times labeled his victory “the most impressive comeback in the history of American presidential
politics.” and stated that “We are all one people, one country, and it is the responsibility of people and
politicians alike to see that Nixon succeeds.”**
Though The New York Times did not endorse Nixon in 1968. it nevertheless expressed
admiration qualities that it saw fit for a President:
...we have always recognized that he is an intelligent, able
man who is essentially a moderate, reponsible conservative
on most issues. His long years in national politics have
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given him the political skills which arc a necessary part of
a successful President’s equipment.*”
Observing that difficulties lay ahead as a result of a Democratic Senate and House. Times editorialists
believed that Nixon would have to make special efforts to enlist bipartisan support. Foreign policy
would also be critical, as ending the Vietnam War would require delicate and skilled negotiations in
Paris:

In foreign affairs, the first priority is to establish a
secure relationship between the incoming and out
going Administrations in the management of the
Paris peace negotiations. Next in importance is the
early ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty. Now that the campaign has ended, we hope
Mr. Nixon will encourage spcecfy Senate action.*”

By creating and holding together a fragile Republican coalition of longtime supporters and
wary right wingers. Richard Nixon finally gained his ultimate goal. The road to detente with China,
an initiative well into the formative stages by 1968. was ready to be embarked upon but not yet reacfy
to be revealed to the American people. Nixon as president began his unprecedented transfer of foreign
policy decnsion-making from the State Department to the Oval Office, a shift that would make his
ensuing personal diplomacy and trip to China all the more stunning to the American public.
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CHAPTER III

Strategic Considerations and Contradictions

On the surface, the foreign policy of President Richard Nixon toward the People’s Republic
of China appeared to be as enigmatic has the man himself. Haring built his meteoric political career
on a foundation of ardent anti-Communism and adversarial rhetoric against the Chinese and Soviets.
Nixon, upon assuming the presidency , switched tactics and pursued a course of rapprochement with
both nations at the height of the war in Vietnam. Nixon’s display of political agility in changing
diplomatic tact in the shadow of a looming Communist Chinese threat to all of Asia represented a
startling turnabout to Republicans, who feared the new path was an inevitable disaster and
acquiescence to Conununism.
Though it is fair to assume that Nixon’s conservative Republican credentials made it possible
for him to pursue détente with Communist China in an atmosphere of simmering east-west tension,
the diplomatic aspects of the decision were far more prominent than domestic political reactions.
Though Richard Nixon embodied the term "political animal.” the decision to bring Communist China
into the contemporary world arose from geopolitical factors relatively beyond one man’s control, even
the President of the United States. These factors not only represented the dawning of a new age
within twentieth century international diplomacy, but held in the balance the lives of thousands of
American soldiers around the world.
A new dimension to the Nixon political persona, pragmatism on his part, was the realistic
middle path betw een those of complete escalation of a destructive an unpopular war in Southeast Asia
and a potentially crippling (in terms of U.S. prestige) capitulation to a hated Communist foe. Though
all signs from Nixon’s past pointed towards a continuing hard-line stance against China, the
destruction of his predecessor's career as well as his own desire to implement a new and stable peace
structure for the world inspired Nixon’s pragmatism toward Communist China. However, it must not
39
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be assumed that Chinese rapprochement was purely a forced hand or the manifestation of a grand
vision of peace. Geopolitics was central if not paramount, the practice of which was manifested in
Ni.\on-Kissingcr balance-of-power diplomacy.
By pursuing detente with Communist China at the same time as the Sino-Soviet schism
deepened. Nixon was able to indirectly pressure the Soviet Union by means of subtly taking sides in
that conflict. The Soviet Union was in a perfect position for Nixon to engage in balance-of-power
pressure, as it was threatened at the time by Chinese troop emplacements along their common border
as well as intimidated by the prospect of a nuclear China. American overtures towards the Chinese
allowed China a chance to reduce its military presence in Vietnam as well as its own coastal defense
positions near Taiwaiu and reinforce its internal security. President Nixon’s position on China moved
him closer to his three core foreign policy imperatives simultaneously: "peace with honor” in
Vietnam, arms control and other policy concessions from the U.S.S.R. and a reformulation of
America’s international peacekeeping role.

Changing Attitudes and the Kissinger Factor

Though the pragmatic nature of Nixonian foreign policy may well have been forced upon the
president by the emerging specters of a losing effort in Vietnam and a grooving international
multipolaric power structure, the inevitability of reopening China did not reconcile with his antiCommunism during his service in the Eisenhower administration. As late as 1958. Nixon wished to
have on record that he was "unequivocally opposed at this time to recognition of Red China.” and
wrote to a Duke Law School friend that in his view, “recognition of China would have a catastrophic
effect on the anti-Communist and non-Communist nations in Asia.”’ Such statements, made in the
wake of the Korean War and just before American military intervention in Southeast Asia, represent
Nixon’s prc-presidential sense of unflagging opposition to communism.
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By the closing years of the 1960s. the public writings and addresses of Nixon regarding the
importance of the China question began to close the gap with his personal beliefs. In the Foreign
Affairs article of 1967, Nixon articulated a dire warning to the American foreign policy establishment
about the consequences of China’s isolation that represented a complete reversal from his stance as
rice-president;
Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever
outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its
hates and threaten its neighbors...The world cannot be safe until China
changes. Thus our aim. to the extent that we can influence events,
should be to induce change.*
As a private citizen. Richard Nixon viewed China not only as a potential menace to world
peace in the near future, but also as the linchpin to any conceivable peace in Vietnam with honor for
the United States. Eventual detente with China and the Soviet Union was to Nixon, the key to
maintaining a stable regional security structiue that would avert further U.S. military entanglements
in Asia as well as give America diplomatic leverage by playing the Communist nations off of one
another. "Unless the superpowers adopt a new live-and-let-live relationship, the world will not sec
real peace in this century. If we fail to work toward that end suicidal war is inevitable.”*
Another question centered on the Nixon historical record and the reopening of Cliina is the
amount of credit that should be given to the President for the initiative itself. Was it Nixon, the long
time anti-Communist but shrewd politician and diplomatic visionary, who formulated and carried out
the policy with the power of his office, who deserves full historical credit? What was the role of Henry
Kissinger. Nixon administration Deputy National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, a man
of acknowledged tactical and intellectual brilliance who set up the breakthrough Peking meeting by
utilizing backchaimcl. clandestine diplomacy?*
As evidenced by the themes of his Foreign Affairs article, candidate Nixon recognized the
growing threat of a belligerent China to the peace of the free world and intended to set in motion
gestures of rapprochement if elected to the presidency . Though Nixon’s political ascendancy had in
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large measure been based on stringent anti-Communism. heavy American losses in Vietnam, strong
domestic pressure to end the war and the growing problem of Soviet conventional arms superiority
forced Nixon to adopt a more flexible approach to world affairs. The Sino-Soviet rift offered Nixon an
opportunity to exploit their schism to achieve the U.S. goal of limited international military
commitments as well as extraction of American forces from an unpopular war.
According to journalist Marvin Kalb, a print reporter who covered the Nixon presidency,
the Sino-Soviet rift gave Nixon an opportunity to use the Chinese against the real enemy, the Soviet
Union:
By the time Nixon changed his status from candidate to President, he had
alreacN pieced together the elements of a new policy toward China. Though
Nixon was still a staunch anti-Communist. he was aware of America’s
changing mood, and he recognized the...advantages of proclaiming a new
era of reconciliation with the Conununist world...Given the sharp tension in
Sino-Soviet relations, he began to see Peking as his major weapon in the
diplomatic game to gain leverage over the Kremlin.*
The China plan was Nixon’s, to be carried out in tandem with Kissinger and taking advantage of his
tactical expertise. “The China initiative was Nixon’s. ” said General Alexander Haig, a close Nixon
advisor. “Henry was very skeptical until he analyzed its potential consequences, and then he became
the most effective tactical operator in getting it done.”* Kissinger was an effective messenger for the
president and provided invaluable diplomatic support to Nixon in pre-sununit talks in Peking that set
the stage for the Shanghai communiqué. According to Kissinger himself, Nixon modem day balanceof-power scheme with peaceful equilibrium replacing forced Communist containment was a plan he
was immediately able to endorse.

To Kissinger critic Seymour Hersch. writing in The Price of

Power, the depth of Kissinger’s knowledge of China was surprisingly shallow for a nationally
renowned Harvard University professor specializing in international diplomacy:
There is no evidence that Kissinger seriously considered the question of an
American-Chinese rapprochement before his appointment as Nixon’s
national security advisor . Nixon emerged as the grand theoretician and
Kissinger as his occasional operative, the agent who found some backchannels and delivered a few messages. ..By the end of the summer (1969),
Kissinger- not surprisingly- had become convinced that Nixon was right
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about the possibility of rapprochement with China...*

Kissinger, preoccupied with Cold War confrontational diplomac) between the United States
and Soviet Union, subscribed to the theory of Sino-Soviet ideological unity prominent in the 1950s.
He gave little effort to stucMng the thought process of Chairman Mao and general Chinese history,
and therefore “his vision of China retained its Cold War grimness, unchanged since the days of John
Foster Dulles.”®
Although it is evident that the China initiative was formulated and put into motion by Nixon,
Henry Kissinger’s lack of expertise in the area before his appointment to the administration was
eclipsed by his brilliant collaboration with Nixon in their attempt to create peaccfiil geopolitical
equilibrium by way of detente with China. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of regional stability was
marked by a symbiotic relationship between the two men, a “unique fusion of style and substance.”
The Nixon presidential decision-making process, characterized by solitary deliberation and
consolidation of policy making power within the Oval Office, was enhanced bv' the rare trust that
Nixon extended to Kissinger. Whether intellectually or comraderie-bascd. this contradicted the
mistrust and contempt Nixon felt towards the Eastern establishment and represented a personal leap
of faith by him. Kissinger articulated his view of the working relationship between the two men to
Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in 1972, conceding the importance of Nixon’s foreign policy
knowledge as well as the fusion that had occurred between them;
We mustn’t forget that before he ever met me. President Nixon had always
been active in matters of foreign policy . Even before he was elected it was
obvious that foreign policy mattered greatly to him. He has very clear ideas
on the subjea. 1am not at all so sure 1could have done what I’ve done with
another president. Such as special relationship, 1 mean the relationship
between the President and me, always depends on the style of both men.
What I’ve done was achieved because he made it possible for me to do it."
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This sense of achievement based on mutually similar styles of foreign policy was critical to
the success of the China initiative, for it represented a check of egos on the part of Nixon and
Kissinger that in turn created the fluidity necessary for complex and relatively secretive diplomacv.
“You have to give both Nixon and Kissinger the credit— Nixon because he is the president.” said
Winston Lord, former Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. “Within less than a month after
the inauguration, there was a memorandum ftom Nixon to Kissinger which, in eflecl said: 1want to
start getting in touch with the Chinese. ’ Kissinger was brilliant in carrying out this approach
and in implementing the vision of the president. ”' '
Given the dynamic nature of the Nixon-Kissinger partnership, as well as their individual
penchants for power consolidation and chess board diplomacy, it was inevitable that a new approach
to containing communism would evolve and be unilaterally implemented by Nixon. This approach
was simply the use of detente as an updated and revitalized version of traditional containment.
American rapprochement with a Communist superpower such as China would maintain the
international balance-of -power by remaining consistent with the availability of U.S. resources.'^ No
longer would or could ideology alone qualify an apparently hostile nation as an adv ersary . The Nixon
administration shifted away from the dogmatic commimist containment theories subscribed to by the
previous four presidents upon the realization that by the late 1960s. even ideologically opposed
nations such as the U.S. and China shared some common objectives, in this case the strategic
necessity of preventing Soviet encroachment into Asia.'®
Representative of Nixon’s shift to foreign policy pragmatism in light of popular discontent
with the Vietnam War. the growing nuclear capability of China and the need to curtail U.S. world
policing responsibilities, detente as policy stood in sharp contrast to the president’s previously
staunch anti-Cotnmunism. Nixon, one of America’s preeminent cold warriors, had to reduce the
chances of future U.S. military intervention abroad, particularly in Asia, as he was elected on a
platform that called for the end of the Vietnam War According to Robert Littwak. the new Nixon-
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Kissinger foreign policy strategy of reduced U.S. physical commitments in lieu of creative diplomacy
resulted in a major change of decision making processes;

...the adoption of a rather more Byzantine, less ideological foreign policy
approach, characterized ly maneuver and manipulatioiL marked a funda
mental shill in American national style of conducting international affairs.
Here, the close bond between style and substance is unequivocal as a
transformation of the former led to one of the latter.'^
This policy transformation, predicated as much upon the NLxon-Kissingcr partnership as the
President’s view of world security, was the catalyst for creating a blueprint for a new regional peace
structure with the end of Chinese isolation at its core. Integral to the new foreign policy approach
would be Nixon’s acceptance, under domestic pressure to end the war and lessen America s
international military commitments to contain communism in such far-off places as Southeast Asia
and Africa, of pragmatism in the face of a personal history of Cold War intransigence.'® By all
appearances. Nixon became a convert to pragmatic thinking regarding China after his April. 1967
tour of Asia. Writing in the 1980s. Nixon justified his Chinese policy reversal by extolling themes of
pragmatism at the presidential lev el as a necessary way to accomplish goals that may be impopular:
Those who practice pragmatism as an end in itself and those who oppose
it as an unmitigated evil are both wrong. Pragmatism can be justified, but
only as a means to achieve great goals . In short to achieve great goals a
leader must find ways to persuade others to reinterpret and even to some
times go against their interests and principles. But at times he must go
against his own interests and principles to achieve those same goals. This
is especially true in foreign policy.'
Nixonian pragmatism formed the foundation for new foreign policy flexibility towards
Commimist nations, as well as a structural change that would ultimately reduce the chances of U.S.
military entanglements in other countries. More importantly, though, regarding the Asian dilemma.
Nixon’s new outlook moved towards overtly reducing tensions between the U.S. and China as his
rhetoric de-emphasized tensions caused by past dogmatism. Beginning in the opening minutes of his
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first term as president in January. 1969. Nixon's words served as harbingers of detente. "After a
period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. We seek an open world; open to ideas,
open to cxhange of goods and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry
isolation.”'*

The Nixon Doctrine and Chinese Detente

At the foundation of Nixon 's shift to detente with China was the advent and implementation
of the Nixon Doctrine. The Doctrine was based on the continuing need to maintain international
order through the treaty system but at the same time reduce U.S. military commitments throughout
the world The appearance of pulling back U.S. forces from conflict with Commimists was
unthinkable to a young Nixon, who. following a civilian trip to East Berlin in 1963, wrote that
meeting the challenge of counteracting communism was the ultimate responsibility of free nations;
The Communist goal is to impose slavery on the Free World Our goal
must be nothing less than to bring freedom to the Communist world
Our policy must be guided by one overriding principle; We stand for
freedom—not only for ourselves, but for all people.'®
By 1970. though. Chinese support of the resilient North Vietnamese, strong domestic
opposition to the war and the need to apply pressure to the Soviet Union for arms control concessions
convinced Nixon that peace with China could only occur by changing the nature of America's defense
commitments. Unacceptably high casualty rates in Vietnam made it clear that the U.S. had
overextended itself in protecting vulnerable Southeast Asian nations. So. the Nixon Doctrine
proposed that regional security organization based on treaties and committed to negotiation rather
than aggression would be the first line of defense against communism around the world with the
UnitedStates agreeing to ultimately honor its military commitments to maintain its own credibility.
In this scenario, collective defense pacts served as deterrents to aggression and spared America the
burden of dispatching large numbers of troops to foreign countries immediately to counter communist
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insurgency' or invasion. With a large segment of the American people tired of losing sons to
defending tiny foreign nations from commimists. the will present in post-World War 11 and Korean
War eras to sacrifice for the freedom of foreign peoples had largely evaporated. Foreign policy
commentator Earl Ravenal argued that "The Nixon Doctrine itself was a response primarily to certain
domestic problems, which can be defined as economic stringency and lack of a concerted 'national
interest.’”'®
However concerned Nixon may have been with the tide of domestic dissent with his Asian
policy during his first administration, his public writings before the 1968 presidential campaign
indicate his belief that the key to international peace was to bring China into the community of
nations. In accordance with implementing the Nixon Doctrine in Asia to reduce U.S. military
presence there. Nixon strongly believ ed that the China problem had to be dealt with sooner than later.
"Any American policy towards Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China.” he wrote
in “Asia After Vietnam.” Nixon explained that the nations of the free world had to come to grips with
the contemporary Communist China, as ignoring the main source of aggression in Asia and its
populace would bode darkly for the future:
Taking the long view, we simply carmot afford to leave China forever
outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its
hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet
for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.
Deviating from his former position of inflexible determination against Communism. Nixon’s
doctrine provided the world community with a stark and measure policy that affected both American
allies and enemies. After years of relative indecision and lack of focus regarding the war in Southeast
Asia, the Nixon Doctrine set forth principles of regional defense and reinforced American
commitment to its treaty partners that would save the U.S. military from unpopular entanglements in
the future as well as reassure the public that its president had the best in mind for it as well as the
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nation’s credibility. "A formal statement for the American position provided for the first time clearcut criteria for fiiend and foe,” wrote Henry Kissinger. “Domestically, it supplied a coherent answer
to charges to overextensions: and nations in Asia dreading American withdrawal found in the
doctrine considerable reassurance once they found them.”~
Though the Nixon Doctrine was an overall framework for America’s role in maintaining
world stability and defending its allies, it was primarily aimed at making contact with and assuaging
China's fear of U.S. imperialism in Asia, triggered by MacArthur’s invasion of North Korea in 1950.
Coupled with its imderlving message of attacking the Soviet Union with Chinese rapprochement, the
doctrine served dual Cold War purposes of increasing pressure on the Soviets by decreasing pressure
on China. “The improvement of relations with China was regarded as the logical corollary to the
application of the Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia.” wrote Robert Littwak. “For it was envisioned
that the development of a comprehensive Sino-American rapprochement would contribute to the
creation of the stable regional conditions which would permit the orderly devolution of American
power.”"" Nixon’s vision of peace through negotiation backed by regional security organizations as
articulated in the doctrine recognized that the absence of American troops fighting Conummist
soldiers would decrease the propaganda of Conununism and the will of populations to rebel and resist
perceived U.S. imperialism."® “In Asia, where the Nixon Doctrine was emmciated. partnership will
have special meanings for our policies , our cooperation with Asian nations will be enhanced as thev
cooperate with one another and develop regional institutions.” Nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs.
Designing a Pacific security apparatus was central to the Asian application of the Doctrine,
as Nixon recognized the futility of America’s policing Asian wars of nationalism. A collective Asian
security organization would lessen the U.S. military burden in the region b>' shifting away from the
bipolar natiue of U.S.-China confrontation, and towards multipolarity in the form of treat)'
organizations. The plan called for increased inter-Asian cooperation and response to conummist
threats as the first firewall against aggression. Instead of instant committal of U.S. troops to nations
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under threat the\ would be the final fallback in the defense of liberty. Nixon wrote of such a Pacific
conununity;

this has to be a conununi^ in the fullest sense; a conununity of piuposc.
of understanding and of mutual assistance, in which military defenses are
coordinated while economies are strengthened; a community embracing
a concert of Asian strengths as a counterforce to the designs of China..

To NLxon. the alternative to collective seciuity in Asia was a grim vision of constant threats to free
nations both within and outside of China's sphere of influence as well as the impending reality of an
immense and restless nation with the nuclear option. The quagmire in Vietnam and failure of
outdated and inflexible containment policy convinced the ardently anti-Communist Nixon that
raRirochement was not only in the best interests of the United States and himself as a politician, but
the world at large, as well. Speaking at an AFL-CIO convention on Dec. 13. 1971 in Bal Harbour.
Florida. Nixon explained the troubling prospect of continued U.S.-Chinese confrontation, as well as
the responsibilities of his office:
There are over 750 million people in China ..within 20 years they will have
atomic weapons , that's a very significant threat to the peace of the world if
they want it to be a threat. What do we do about it? Do we wait 10. 15. 20
years from now and continue to stand in confrontation?... With the advent of
nuclear warfare, a President of the United States, with an obligation to future
generations, has no choice but to talk about them...*®
Richard Nixon still maintained that China was an aggressive outlaw nation which sponsored
worldwide conununist subversion. However, it appears that recognition of the military debacle in
Vietnam, domestic disillusionment with it as well as the office of the presidency softened Nixon's
rigidity and prodded him towards pragmatism. True, any perceived appeasement of China or the
Soviet Union would inevitably invite criticism and cries of “NLxon the hypocrite” from Old Guard
Republicans. Nixon's core constituents. Nevertheless, the Nixon Doctrine was. at face value, a
modification of purpose from a superpower gradually witnessing the shocking limits of its power. The
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middle ground replace extremism, pragmatism replaced dogmatism and true balance-of-power
strategy returned to the world stage for the first time since the days of the European Triple Entente. In
praising the Nixon Doctrine and its unique combination of resolve and flexibility. Henry Kissinger
wrote;
We developed a military strategy that fit our capacities for dealing with
the more plausible dangers. And we advanced a doctrine for the security
of the Pacific area that gave new assurance to our allies and friends. Of
all the achievements in Nixon's first term, 1 consider the preservation of
the sinews of our military strength among the most significant...For
moderation is a virtue only in those who are thought to have a choice."

The Soviet Role in the China Equation

According to Nixon himself, the importance of recognizing Conununist China was strictly a
matter of geopolitical strategy to insure world peace, rather than a decision based on his own political
goals. It seems as though the "old” Nixon, preoccupied with the worldwide and domestic threat of
monolithic communism would have operated upon his instinctual abhorrence of communism once in
office and continued the greatest ideological conflict of the 20th century with military' means. Instead.
balance-of-power diplomacy was utilized to spare American lives and non-confrontationally apply
pressure to the Soviet Union. Describing the China plan in his own words. Nixon wrote:
And yet my visit was an act of cold, dispassionate pragmatism. When it
was armounced in 1971.1was praised by' the left and attacked by the right,
both for the wrong reasons...7%e China initiative had nothing to do with
my attitude towards communism. My decision was based on my belief that
the seciuity of the United States would be served by developing better
relations with the one Communist power that was not on good terms with
the other, the Soviet Union—a much more formidable adversary.^
Strategically, then, the decision to proceed with a Sino-American rapprochement was designed as
much to gain leverage over the Soviet Union, the main military rival of the United States, as it was to
ease tensions with China, a rapidly expanding nuclear power and key player in the Vietnam War.
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According to Allen Whiting, the NLxon administration believed that if Moscow was faced
with a U.S.-Chinese entente at the same time as tensions were escalating with Beijing, it would be
more apt to make SALT concessions and limit its support of Middle Eastern insurgency . In turn, the
Chinese would obtain a counterbalance against the Soviets in exchange for setting the Taiwan issue
aside while U.S.-China relations thawed. Most importantly for Nixon, however, was that detente
would serve to isolate Hanoi from both of its commimist allies, in the process reducing Soviet military
aid to North Vietnam and China's political opposition to a negotiated end to the war."'® No longer
would Cold War confrontation simply by a U.S.-Soviet conflict; China was now a legitimate nations
on the world stage due to military capacity, commitment to pure communist ideology and its growing
schism with the Soviet Union over border concerns and fear of physical military encirclement.
Nixon's goal of keeping the U.S. out of costly military ventures abroad and at the same time
maintaining American credibility demanded a new kind of diplomacy based on playing the two
communist powers against one another. "Triangle diplomacy” became the new term for the delicate
maneuvering which would preserve not only an Asian balance of power, but a deterrent to nuclear
war as well.^ Addressing American exploitation of the Sino-Soviet spliL Nixon wrote than though
this type of diplomacy was risky, it provided a moderate course for the U.S. that did not involve
committal of American troops.
Triangular diplomacy can work to our advantage or our disadvantage.
As long as that rivalry persists, however, it not only ties down a large
portion of the Soviet forces militarily and affects the overall balance
of power, it also seriously undermines the Soviet position in the Third
World.^'
Fundamental to the application of triangular diplomacy was the high state of tensions
between China and the Soviet Union, a growing problem between the two nations over differing
communist ideology as interpreted by Mao and traditional Marxist-Leninists. a territorial dispute over
parts of historically Chinese lands now controlled by the Soviets (i.e. Outer Mongolia), rivalry for
leadership over other communist nations such as Hungary and Cuba, and personal animosity between
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Mao and Nikita Khrushchev. Most pressing to the Chinese in the late 1960s was a Soviet military
buildup around China particularly concentrated on the 4.000-plus mile common border the two
nations s h a r e . T h e Soviets, nervous about China’s nuclear capacity and the sheer strain of its
growing population, perceived a vivid Chinese threat to its own national security as well as its border
area. “Some Russian leaders seemed to take very seriously Chinese hints that they might press claim
to large portions of Soviet territory.” wrote A. Doak Barnett on the shifting strategic balance in
Nixon-cra Asia. “Moscow watched with considerable apprehension the progress the Chinese were
making from 1964 on. in developing an independent nuclear capacity. It was also angered by
Peking’s relentless ideological and propaganda attacks and its efforts to compete against and
undermine Soviet influence throughout the world.”^^
Soviet military superiority over China's forces was crucial to Nixon's decision to extend
rapprochement that eventually led to diplomatic relations. The potentially staggering size of the
Chinese military, their development of the atomic bomb in 1964 and China's enormous civilian
resource base worried Nixon particularly in light of its intervention in the Korean War, but their
historical isolation and fear of invasion, especially by the Soviets, played into his hands. “On the
Chinese side, the incentive was about the Soviets.” said Winston Lord, former Ambassador to China,
“...the two nations had just had a border clash, and the Chinese were worried about their security.
They also saw eventual trade and economic advantages with us...”^
With a combination of massed Soviet forces on its flank and an acute threat of internal
destabilization due to Cultural Revolution chaos. China was clearly nearing a concession in ideology
by dealing directly with the U.S. to prevent a potential nuclear war. “The immediate cause for the
breakthrough was fear in Peking of Moscow, and of scores of divisions on the borders of China.”
contended Marshall Green. Nixon administration Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.^® China, the weaker power, was in an imtenable position regarding it national seciuity
without the help of the United States, creating a clear opportunity for Nixon. The U.S. was not
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directly involved in the Communist split, allowing Nixon to use detente in place of American
firepower to re-balance the power. The man who had once said. “Communism requires a worldwide
defense” may well have come to the rescue of one of his greatest political and diplomatic enemies.^
The goal of both the U.S. and China was preventing hostile Soviet encroachment into Asia. Writing
in retrospect Nixon described why he put decades of personally virulent anti-communism behind him
to pursue detente with China;
In view of ...irreconcilable differences, what brought us together?...The
real reason was our common strategic interest in opposing Soviet domi
nation in Asia. Like the Soviet Unioit China was a Commimist country.
The United States was a capitalistic nation. But we did not threaten them,
while the Soviet Union did. It was a classic case of a nation’s security
interest overriding ideology.^'
The Soviets had also become preoccupied with the possibility of a major military clash with
the Chinese, and went on a diplomatic offensive to appeal to the world community for condemnation
of Chinese military aggression at the border. The Nixon administration, notably Henry Kissinger.
recognized that gains could be extracted from the Soviet Union on various diplomatic issues if the
U.S. moved towards a policy of Chinese containment. In an internal report to Nixon on diplomatic
advantages for the U.S. while the Sino-Soviet border crisis raged. Kissinger wrote;
I believe this is solid evidence of the growing obsession of Soviet
leaders with their China problem , at least it suggests that the
Soviets may become more flexible in dealing with East-West issues...
Thus. Soviet concern may have finally reached a point that it can
be turned to our advantage...

This point in time could well have been the realization that border animosities and strained
diplomacy with an erratic and paranoid Chinese foreign policy apparatus cold have realistically
escalated into warfare. As a member of the Center for the Stucfr of Democratic Institutions. Fred
Warner Neal recognized that China did not agree with the policy of coexistence with the West
supported by Khrushchev, intended to avert a massive war caused by the final showdown between
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capitalism and communism. Peking, in its ideological fervor, espoused the inevitability of war and
this attitude worried the Soviet Union;
While both the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China have as
their immediate aim the spread of socialist ideology. Moscow feels
that success depends on avoiding war, something also in the Soviet
national interest. Peking, on the other hand, accepts the risk of war
as perhaps a necessary corollary to both her national and ideological
interests.^®
Even before the first NLxon administration there had been congressional testimony that
detente with the Soviet Union was the only realistic way to prevent Communist China from
dominating Asia. Such an undertaking was beyond the abilities of either the United States or the
U.S.S.R., but collectively, containment was possible. Although this would require a tenuous political
balancing act by NLxon to avoid right-wing Republican criticism of Communist appeasement, alliance
through detente was critical to easing tensions that could have resulted in nuclear war or U.S. military
intervention in the Sino-Soviet rift. At the 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings about
U.S. policy toward China, former Senator Joseph Clark agreed with Professor Hans Morgenthau’s
testimony that American policy should be geared towards detente with the Soviet Union. “Senator
Clark felt that only with a relaxation of strained Soviet-American relations could a realistic
containment of Peking come about, not to crush China, but for some sort of sensible accommodation
that would restrain the more belligerent tactics and points of view within the Maoist hierarchy.”®®

China Recognition; The Vietnam Link

One of the most striking aspects about Nixon’s decision to extend detente to China was its
linkage to the war in Vietnam; more specifically, the President’s willingness to make overtures to a
Communist arch-enemy in order to extricate American troops with honor from the land of another
enemy. Chinese detente would be a concrete step towards isolating Hanoi, with which Peking had a
historically tenuous relationship at best As proposed in the Shanghai commimique. a document
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issued a the end of Nixon's China visit, the U.S. would gradually wind down its military presence in
Taiwan and Southeast Asia as tensions' in the area decreased- a veiled reference to China’s help in
ending the war. However, playing two Communist superpowers off of one another to end American
involvement in Southeast Asia represented a major turnaround for Nixon, the former hawk, a man
who as vice-president had advocated using nuclear weapons to save French forces under siege at Fort
Dien Bien Phu by communists.
Ardent anti-Communism and avocation of extreme measures to combat what he viewed as
imminent Communist domination of Southeast Asia characterized the Nixon worldview during his
early political career. A disciple of Eisenhower’s domino theory.’ Nixon saw a Communist victory in
Vietnam triggering the fall of the remainder of Southeast Asia, and subsequent Communist Chinese
and Soviet domination of the entire region.®' From this perspective it becomes clear that Nixon’s
desire to extend detente to China seventeen years later to gain leverage over the U.S.S.R. resulted
from American difficulties in Southeast Asia and the need to reformulate U.S. security commitments.
It is noteworthy that by the time of America’s diplomatic overtures to China. Nixon had abandoned
the domino theory after a réévaluation of the war’s very nature. Members of his foreign policy staff,
such as American Ambassador to Vietnam William Sullivan, believed that China was reluctant to
have a unified Vietnam relatively hostile to Peking perched on its southern flank and supplied by the
Soviet military. According to Sullivan. “China sought a Balkanized Indochina with two Vietnams
and independent states of Laos and Cambodia. If Vietnam were to be imited imder the Hanoi
government and control Laos and Cambodia, one of the strongest states in Asia would be created and
might establish a role in Asian affairs inimical to that of China.”®'
In the pre-simunit years of his presidency. Nixon viewed detente with China as inevitably
leading to a negotiated peace in Vietnam. A loose Sino-American alliance would insure a continuing
American presence in South Vietnam during the short term, allaying Chinese fears of Soviet
encirclement in the event of a sudden U.S. withdrawal. In the long run. however, Nixon was wrong
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The Peking summit produced no concrete agreement between the U.S. and China to woik together to
end the war. only a vague reference in the Shanghai communiqué to diminish' tensions in the area as
a peaceful and internal solution was ap^ied by China to Taiwan. The lack of such an agreement to
end the war gave conservative Nixon critics the ammunition the needed to insist that the summit was
a failure in the immediate cause of obtaining definite results and cooperation from China over
Vietnam.
While Nixon's decision to pursue diplomatic relations with China did not result in the end of
the Vietnam War. it did signal American recognition of the end of anti-Communist dogma as an ends
to a mean. The Nixon Doctrine reversed two decades of increasingly outdated containment strategy,
allowing the U.S. to reduce it role as world policeman against communism and the first, immediate
line of military defense of small nations under aggression. Under intense domestic pressure to end the
automatic committal of U.S. troops to foreign countries to fight communism. Nixon's plan for
regional security organizations would scale back American involvement in Asia while simultaneously
maintaining U.S. credibility to its allies under defense treaties. Richard Nixon was forced to adjust to
the emergence of multipolarity with China’s military ascension and the growing capacity of the
U.S.S.R. to produce weapons, and his response to this scenario was engagement in previously
imthinkablc policy of balance-of-power diplomacy with Communist nations. If he did not. Nixon
would have surely would up as another presidential casualty of the Vietnam War.
Nixon took a significant political risk in implementing the Nixon Doctrine and initiating
detente overtimes towards China, but the need to counterbalance the Soviet Union and reduce
casualties in Vietnam until peace with honor’ could be achieved made pragmatism the only realistic
path. With the invaluable aid of Henry Kissinger. Nixon took advantage of a window of historical
opportunity for great personal success, if limited strategic triumph.
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CHAPTER IV

The Trip to China and Beyond

Stepping onto an airport tarmac in Peking, February 21. 1972. President Nixon began a
highly promising if short lived policy of detente with Communist China, an era of mutual goodwill
that came crashing down along with his presidency by 1975. By establishing himself as an expert on
foreign affairs as well as a right-leaning Republican president. Nixon possessed the right confluence
of diplomatic and political credibility to embark upon the China initiative and shepherd iL with
BCissinger’s help, to the Peking summit. At the minimum, his initiative created an instant thaw in
Sino-American relations, producing an atmosphere that Nixon hoped would lead directly to peace in
Vietnam. The famous handshake between Nixon and Chairman Mao was beamed around the globe
via satellite, a compelling symbol of communism and capitalism living in harmony, at least in Asia.
However, behind the historical siunmit and festive dinners lay troublesome issues for both
Nixon and Mao. After literally decades of staunch and sometimes strident anti-Communism. Nixon
confronted the brutal truth that growing Chinese military power posed a serious threat to both
American security and interests, and that an adversarial confrontation with China could well lead to
nuclear war. No longer could domestic political points be scored by inflamed anti-Communist
rhetoric; with stakes so high and detente with the Soviet Union in the balance, public talk of
preemptive strikes and aggressive containment action was no longer responsible. Nixon as president
had transcended the partisanship he had for so long espoused as a candidate, and the summit and its
aftermath recast him in the public eye as a statesman working diplomatic wonders.
The controversy siurounding U.S. military protection of Taiwan as well as America's
support of its Nationalist govcrruncnt was the major obstacle to improved relations. The refusal by
four presidents to recognize Taiwan as a legitimate part of the People’s Republic had resulted in not
59
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only China’s isolation from the world, but its unrelenting antagonism toward the U.S.. and its
willingness to intervene militarily in Asia if necessary. Although the Chinese leadership was not
willing in 1971 to make the initial overture for a Sino-American détente, it desperately needed
improved relations to offset the Soviet military threat to its borders as well as growing Soviet
influence in Southeast Asia. A formal summit with Richard NLxon on Chinese soil may have had the
appearance to the Chinese public of an American act of tribute to Mao, but to the communist hard
liners. it represented an ideological softening of the Revolution.
Thus, the stake were high for both NLxon and the Communist Chinese leadership during the
détente years of 1971-1975. a short but monumental period in which China was reopened, the war in
Vietnam was ended, and Richard NLxon was forced to resign from office. Though Nixon reaped
tangible benefits from his decision to informally recognize Communist China in terms of performing
a diplomatic tour de force one year before the next presidential election, did the nation as a whole
benefit as much as he? Was the Peking summit substantively successful enough to lead to genuinely
improved Chinese-American relations, or was it simply a one-time diplomatic show to increase
pressure on the Soviets from both nations? In terms of history, how important was the Shanghai
Communiqué, and did it actually support the themes of the Nixon Doctrine?

The China Decision Unfolds: Shuttle Diplomacy and Ping-Pong

With the Nixon presidency entering its second full year in 1970. tensions between the
Kremlin and China escalated enough to promote détente as a response to a looming Soviet threat. As
the Ussuri River clashes of 1969 broke the threshold of physical violence the ideal time had arrived
for Nixon to set his realpolitik China initiative in motion. Moving slowly at first Nixon exploited
Sino-Soviet friction by relaxing American trade sanctions against China by allowing non-strategic
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sales to the Chinese and welcoming $100 worth of Chinese goods into the U.S. from Hong Kongretuming tourists.’ Though such moves were fairly undramatic. they nonetheless sent strong
messages of conciliation to Peking without overtly hinting to the American people of the course to
come. The administration, however, indicated that it would not proceed to the diplomatic stage
without Chinese reciprocation in some form, a signal that indicated relaxing hostility towards the
United States. In his second Foreign Policy Report submitted to Congress. February 25, 1971. the
president reiterated his lingering doubts about Chinese willingness to begin direct contacts with the
U.S. Nevertheless, his administration was actively considering ways to reach out to the Chinese and
would not be deterred by slow Chinese response:
We should, however, by totally realistic about the prospects. The People’s
Republic continues to convey to its own people and to the world its deter
mination to cast us in the devil’s role . So long as Peking continues to be
adamant for hostility, there is little we can do by ourselves to improve
the relationship. What we can do. we will."
Nixon went on to declare that the United States was prepared to “open a dialogue ” with Peking with
out recognizing the validity of its political ideologies or ambitions in Asia.
President Nixon’s proclamation of U.S. willingness to make contact with the Chinese was a
tacit acknow ledgment of his Two-China approach.^ In essence. Nixon would not completely abandon
the Nationalist Taiwanese at that point for full recognition of Communist authority over the mainland
and the island, but at the same time he was prepared to push the People’s Republic towards admission
into the international community and possible U.N. participation. The latter was a particularly
sensitive political issue for Nixon and tlie U.S. Congress of 19721, as Republican conservatives would
never accept Communist China’s growing influence with American help. To many it was too sharp a
departure in policy for a congress that for each of the past twenty years had passed resolutions
opposing China’s admittance into the U.N.®
To the American public and especially the GOP. Nixon remained purposefully vague
regarding theChina question and its relation to the U.N. When asked during his March 4. 1971 press

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

62

conference whether he personally favored seating Conununist China, the President circumvented the
issued Iw citing Peking’s intransigence towards Taiwan as the main stumbling block towards any
progress. Declaring the question "moot,” Nixon said that the two nations remained at odds over
China’s refusal to engage in any dialogue as long as the U.S. remained committed to Taiwan.^
Within a month and a half, as American trade restrictions against China were lifted and detente had
actually begun, Nixon was noticeably more outspoken about his administration’s goal of normalizing
relations with Mainland China. Speaking at an April 29, 1971 presidential press conference. Nixon
not only reiterated his hopes for continuing progress between the two superpowers, but broached the
idea of a visit publicly for the first time:
We will proceed on the path that we have been proceeding on. And
that is the way to make progress ..1 would just summarize it this
way: What we have done is broken the ice: now we have to test the
water to see how deep it is. 1would finally suggest that...I hope. and.
as a matter of fact I expect to visit Mainland China sometime in
some capacity* I don’t know what capacity. But that indicates what
I hope for the long term.®
Perhaps the watershed in improved relations between China and the United States occiured
in April. 1971, with the advent of so-called “Ping-Pong Diplomacy.” In what appeared as a Chinese
overtime toward Nixon in response to his detente eflbrts. the Commimists invited the U.S. Table
Tennis Team to visit the People’s Republic following their participation in the world championships
at Nagoya, Japan. ’ For the first time in nearly two decades, Americans would be official guests in
Peking, an event that presaged the visit of the president to China. The team was greeted by Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai, whose welcoming words to the athletes confirmed Chinese desire for contact on
an official level:
‘My request to you.’ he declared, ‘is that upon your return to the
USA you convey greetings to the American people from the
Chinese people. In the past there have been many contacts
between China and the USA. They have been in suspension for
a long time, but now...a new page has been opened in the relations
between the Chinese and American peoples.’*
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NLxon was delighted. “I was surprised as I was pleased by this news.” he recalled. “I had never
expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a Ping-Pong team.”®
A secret message from Zhou Enlai. chaimeled through the office of Pakistan’s Ambassador
to the United States Agha Hilaly on April 21, 1971 was the catalyst for the shuttle diplomacy of
Henry Kissinger than in turn led to the historic Peking summit.'® Though in historical hindsight the
China initiative itself appears to have been Nixon’s idea, Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking was a
classic example of preparing the way’ diplomacy, an action designed to smooth over Sino-American
differences and create an atmosphere of mutual appreciation for the upcoming summit. Under the
guise of making a fact-finding mission to Pakistan to cover for secret, high level talks. Kissinger flew
from Nathia Gali, East Pakistan to Beijing on July 9. 1971, to engage Zhou Enlai on issues of
strategic cooperation and Nixon visit."
At the heart of the Kissinger-Zhou dialogue was the willingness of both sides to make
concessions, or more aptly, strategic deferments, in order for a summit to take place. China needed a
public display of detonate with the United States to offset Soviet pressure and signal its emergence
from the isolation of the Cultural Revolution. Nixon sought relaxed tensions to not only wind down
the war in Vietnam and implement the Nixon Doctrine, but to shore his reelection campaign in 1972.
Kissinger, under heavy pressure from a 48-hoiu- time limit imposed by the secrecy of the trip,
extracted from the Chinese a high degree of flexibility regarding preconditions for diplomatic
dialogue.The Commimists. unlike decades past, did not insist on full U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan
before talks could begin, although any further concessions would subsequently hinge on devolving
American influence on the island. The common link between the two nations remained
counterbalancing the Soviet Union and its military influence in Asia, a mutual goal that required at
least a small degree of cooperation.
True to his penchance for maintaining airs of complete secrecy around sensitive presidential
decisions. Nixon was desperate to keep the talks secret and maintain the pace of the progress. To be
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sure, he had no qualms with conducting personal foreign policy, in many ways circumventing the
U.S. State Department. “Without negotiations in secret, there will be few agreements to sign in
public. In some cases, it is simply the only way to conduct the business of international politics.” he
wrote in his memoirs.'^ The protective shroud Nixon cast around the China initiative was also
influenced by domestic political concerns: the suddenness of the summit announcement would be
necessary to catch conservatives off guard and mute mainstream media criticism by staunch anti
communists determined not to give an inch to China. Nonetheless, preliminary siunmit talks in
China were kept in the strictest confidentiality by Nixon, who feared diplomatic and political
catastrophes if leaks to the press occurred:
Our delicate negotiations with China would have collapsed if my
preliminary diplomatic messages to Chou Enlai or Henry
Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in 1971 had become public. Opponents
of our new relationship in both countries would have sabotaged
our moves toward rapprochement...After an American gossip
columnist reported a conversation which had taken place in a
top-secret National Security Council meeting regarding the IndoPakistan War in 1971. Chou understandably asked if he could
speak candidly with us given the danger of leaks.'®
A week later Richard NLxon, along with Kissinger, flew by helicopter from the Western
White House in San Clemente to a Burbank television studio to make an aimouncement that shocked
the world."’ Having been satisfied by the Chinese premier’s reaction to American overtures and a
subsequent invitation issued by the Premier to Nixon for an official visit the President explained that
“I have requested this television time tonight to armounce a major development in our efforts to build
a lasting peace in the world.”'® Proceeding to read a statement issued simultaneously in the United
States and Peking, Nixon announced that he had accepted Zhou’s invitation to journey to China, and
framed the upcoming trip in terms of improved relations and the quest for world peace:
The meeting between leaders of China and the United States is to
seek normalization of relations between the two countries and
also to exchange views on questions of concern to both sides...!
have taken this action because of my profound conviction that
all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions...It is in this
spirit that 1 will undertake what 1deeply hope will become a
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journey for peace, peace not just for our generation but for future
generations on this earth we share together.'
Public reaction to Nixon’s proposed visit was generally positive, except for angry
denunciations from the GOP s right-wing. Characterizing the China initiative as "immoral, indecent,
insane and fraught with danger." columnist William Loeb of the Manchester Union Leader
symbolized the betrayal that conservatives felt toward Nixon and his apparent softening against
Communism.'* Led by National Review editor William F. Buckley, who labeled the China trip as "a
real blow to American anti-Communism." a group of Review intellectuals formed the Manhattan-12
committee that resolved to abandon its support for the President.'® The right-wing regarded Nixon’s
China trip as a complete contradiction of genuine GOP principles and foreign policy strategy; adding
insult to injury was the fact that the plan had been encouraged and executed in secrecy with little to
no consultation of Republicans outside of Nixon’s inner circle.
Newspaper reaction to Nixon’s announcement was mostly positive regardless of region.
hailing the aimouncement as historic and a recognition of reality. To the editors of The Kansas Citv
Star. Nixon’s disclosure to the nation "was a moment of high history, to be recorded ultimately as one
of the most significant moments of the 1970s.”'® According to the St. Petersburg Times. "President
Nixon hit a home nm with the bases full when he announced he would visit Peking next spring. And
its a whole new ballgame.”~ In the South, a region long wary of Nixon’s actions and motives, editors
largely supported the president and rarely mentioned politics in reference to his China initiative. The
editorial board of The Atlanta Constitution called Nixon’s decision "stunning..a marvelous
breakthrough in the history of international relations.” Acknowledging that Nixon was taking a risk
that his trip would tie used for Communist propaganda purposes, the paper nonetheless praised the
president and his foreign affairs skills:
He is an enthusiast of foreign policy, and protiably feels more at
home there than in the rest of the Presidency. He is going to
establish his foreign policy credentials even more strongly with
the trip.^
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However, dissent came from The New York Times, which described Nixon’s sudden
announcement as an undercutting of Japan. “The abrupt aimotmcement of President Nixon’s plaimed
visit has caused acute embarrassment to the Government of Japan, imposing unfortunate and largely
unnecessary new strains on United States relations with its most important ally in Asia.”'® Times
editors, sympathetic to the Sato Govenunent. faulted Nixon for apparently leaving an important ally
out of the loop at a critical juncture in U.S. decision-making on China, especially one that had fully
supported the American position on Taiwan:
The Japanese have firmly adhered to the United States policy
on Taiwan, a policy that has been a principal obstacle to im
proved relations with Peking for both Washington and Tokyo.
Now Japanese officials fear they have been left out on a limb
by some secret understanding...It would be incredibly short
sighted of the United States Government to make such a
sweeping change in its Asian policy without first consulting
its principal Asian ally.^
Within the U.S. Congress, reaction to the upcoming China trip from conservative quarters
was not uniformly negative. Though most Republicans remained against Communist Chinese
admission into the United Nations, few would come out on record opposed to Nixon’s plans. Even
staunch conservative Sen. Strom Thurmond supported the summit and expressed doubt that a
majority of Congress would oppose U.N. seating'® At this stage of Nixon’s rapidly growing
diplomatic triumph moderate and relative conservatives stepped into line with their president. They
were suspicious of his futiue plans for U.S. Taiwanese policy but unwilling to contradict public
support for the endeavor by publicly criticizing the apparent midstream Nixonian switch. The far
right-wing remained relentless in its hounding of Nixon, but his coalition from 1968 remained
relatively intact and kept isolationist Republicans out of the mainstream and into a hard-line
conservative clique.
Ultimately. President Nixon’s most pressing concerns regarding his trip was the opening of
communication lines between the two nations and an effective dialogue dealing with their many
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differences.' Vital to Nixon’s success in China would be the ability of both sides to acknowledge the
validity of each other’s foreign policy and governing philosophy—diplomatic pragmatism that the
President had practiced in the preceding three decades. Willing to forsake conservative Republican
ideology and initiate constructive talks with Conummist China leading to detente. Nixon the
moderate extolled the importance of talk in preserving world peace. Addressing the AFL-CIO Ninth
Constitutional Convention in 1971. he sounded every bit the Quaker as he spoke of his personal
responsibility;
With the advent of nuclear warfare, a President of the United
States, with an obligation to future generations, has no choice
but to talk about those differences, talk about them with his
goal in mind..talking about them with the great goal of seeing
that the peoples of this world can have different systems but
will not be engaged in nuclear destruction. “

The Joumev East: Nixon in China

In the weeks before he flew to China. Nixon simultaneously played down expectations of the
siunmit and magnified the trip's importance. The talks. Nixon predicted would be just that—talk.
"They will be primarily dialogue.” he said on Feb. 10, 1971. "In the case of Peking there will
necessarily have to be a substantial amount of dialogue before we can come to the point of negotiating
on substantive matters.”^ Nixon, faced with the monumental challenge of breaking through 20 years
worth of tensions that he played a large role in creating knew in advance that Kissinger had alreadv
resolved many policy differences but nonetheless cautioned the public not to expect an instant
solution to traditional conflicts:
...1 think we could say this, this trip should not be one which would
create very great optimism or very great pessimism. It is one in which
we must recognize that 20 years of hostility and virtually no commu
nication will not be swept away Iw one week of discussion... However,
it will mark a watershed in relations..
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Nixon landed in Peking on Feb. 21, 1972. in Air Force One. renamed The Spirit o f ‘76 for
the trip east Prior to his landing, the American and Chinese flags had been run up two flag poles.
leaving fifteen other poles around them bare. On a gray and overcast day a small delegation of
Communist officials waited on the edge of the tarmac; Zhou Enlai stood at the foot of the plane ramp.
wearing a heavy overcoat against the weather.^' Upon arrival. Nixon, fully aware of diplomatic
protocol and particularly the Chinese tribute system, reached his hand towards Zhou on deplaning in
an effort to erase a past Cold War sleight and accord to custom:
1knew that Chou had been deeply insulted by Foster Dulle s
refusal to shake hands with him at the Geneva Conference in
1954. When I reached the bottom step, therefore. 1 made the
point of extending my hand as 1walked toward him. When
our hands met one era ended and another began.
Zhou accompanied Nixon for much of the trip, including trips to the Great Hall of the
People, the Forbidden City and state dinners.

Though the two men engaged in some face-to-face

negotiations, most of the groundwork had alrcatfy been covered during Kissinger’s preliminary
meetings and their respective positions were known to each other. Therefore, though the Peking
summit meetings were fairly substantial, progress on key issues such as Taiwan was limited.
However. Nixon and Zhou Enlai made important diplomatic strides in simply meeting together and
opening lines of communication, but both men realized that the breach that had opened over two
decades could not be closed within a week’s time. Dialogue was opened and common concerns
recognized, but Zhou would not compromise on Taiwan. This was the key issue of the summit and
the Americans conceded that for the time being, the only progress would be American
acknowledgment that Taiwan was indeed part of China proper.
With memories of how the U2 Incident had wrecked the Paris Summit with Khrushchev in
1960. Nixon worried that Chinese demands for the aimexation of Taiwan could destroy the summit
and empower anti-Chinese factions within the U.S. He reasoned that if the Chinese used the summit
for propaganda reasons and refused to make a civil statement of mutual disagreements:
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I would come under murderous cross fire fmm any of all the
various pro-Taiwanese, anti-Nixon, and anti-P.R-C. lobbies
and interest groups at home. If these groups found common
ground on the eve of presidential elections, the entire China
initiative might be turned into a partisan issue. Then, if I
lost the election, whether because of this particular factor
or not my successor might not be able to continue developing
the relationship between Washington and Peking.
Though Nixon walked a fine line at the summit between actively pursuing a U.S. national interests
and mollifying the Chinese over Taiwan, his political acumen made worries about his successor's
relationship with China dubious at best. Had Nixon lost the 1972 election it would have been to a
Democrat. The combination of a failed summit and subsequent Democratic capture of the White
House would have made prospects for continued detente bleak for diplomatic and political reasons.
Thus, for Nixon, it was vital that the China initiative gave the impression of being non-partisan, at
least until after the 1972 party conventions.

Richard Nixon Meets "God"

Perhaps the most memorable image to be beamed internationally over satellite television was
that of President Nixon sitting next to Chairman Mao before entering into private talks. The specter
of two of the most powerful world leaders meeting together at the most high profile summit of the
post-war years not only solidified the credibility of new U.S.-China relations, but boosted Nixon's
stature tremendously in the U.S. and internationally as a preeminent world statesman. Because of his
stature as leader of the world's most populous nation. Nixon held the charismatic Mao in high
esteem. Mao's aura was at its height as he neared the end of his life, as Andre Malraux told Nixon at
a White House dinner before his trip to Peking:
You will be meeting with a colossus, but a colossus facing death...
You will meet a man who has had a fantastic destiny and who
believes that he is acting out the last act of his lifetime. You may
think he is talking to you. but he will in truth be addressing Death..
Mr. President, you operate within a rational framework, but Mao
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docs not. There is something of a sorcerer in him. He is a man in
habited by a vision, possessed by iL^
Nixon's meeting with the Chairman mostly concerned the philosophy underlying the new
Sino-American détente, rather than substantive policy details.However. Nixon did breach certain
subjects that concerned the security interests of both nations, including the Soviet military presence
on the Sino-Soviet border, the future of Japan and its possible rearmament, and the issue of potential
Soviet aggression against both China and the United States. Nixon emphasized his belief that the
Soviets would fill any power vacuum in Asia to achieve their goal of hegemony in the region.
Recalling later that Mao was animated yet seemed tired by the end of their conversation. Nixon wrote
that the two men shared the commonality of having come from poor families to rise to the peaks of
power. Both men also understood what their rapprochement had meant for history, as Mao was also
concerned with the impact their detente had on the course of international peace;
1also came from a very poor family, and to the top of a very great
nation. History has brought us together. The question is whether
we. with different philosophies, but both with feet on the ground
and having come from the people, can make a breakthrough that
will serve not just China and America, but the whole world in the
years ahead And that is why we are here.^^
At a banquet honoring the President in Peking on Feb. 21. 1972. Nixon toasted Premier
Zhou and Chairman Mao and their efforts for peace. In summarizing the spirit and substance of the
summiLPresident Nixon conveyed the sentiment that although major differences

inpolicy and

philosophyremained between China and the U.S.. opening an official line of communicationwas the
vital foundation upon which future relations and peace would be built;
We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great
differences today. What brings us together is that we have
common interests which transcend those differences. As
we discuss our differences, neither one of us will compro
mise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf
between us. we can try to bridge it so that we may be able
to talk across it."^

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

71

Thus, the Peking summit was a dramatic first step (albeit relatively hollow in terms concrete
results) in improving U.S.-Sino relations. That two separate and distinct cultures as Communist
China and the United States were on positive terms was secondary to the primary objectives of
President Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai: each nation took advantage of historical circumstances to
use the other for national security purposes. As the absent third party in detente negotiations, the
U.S.S.R. remained the conspicuous target of the U.S.-China thaw. Both the U.S and China sought
leverage against the Soviet Union and were prepared to discard diplomatic precedent to obtain the
u [ ^ r hand. Taking a tremendous but pre-planned political gamble that the summit would pressure
the Soviets into concessions. Nixon was willing to appease Communist China to a degree in order to
continue the American policy of Russian containment in a different indirect and non-confrontational
form.

The Shanghai Communiqué

On the eve of President Nixon's departure from Peking, a joint statement was issued by
China and the United States outlining summit talking points and mutual policy stances. Known as the
“Shanghai Communiqué,” the document was the result of week-long negotiating sessions and
contained surprisingly honest viewpoints concerning several points of contention between the U.S.
and China. Above all was the general expression of new goodwill between the nations, a drastic
change from decades of Cold War hostilities, suspicions and official diplomatic silence. Though there
were relatively few areas of solid agreement within the communiqué, one section crucial to deescalating future conflicts in the area was that of the agreement that neither nation “should seek
hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region and each is opposed to efibrts by any other country or group to
establish such hegemony.””" Key to this passage was the use of the word “hegemony.” translated by
many in the foreign policy establishment as a code word used Iw China to mean Soviet
expansionism.^' Heavy losses and strong domestic pressures to withdraw forces fiom Vietnam.
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combined with the regional security plan of the Nixon Doctrine practically insured that the United
States would be minimally involved in Asian wars in the future.
Characterizing Sino-American cooperation against hegemonic drives “perhaps the most
vitally important section of the Shanghai Communiqué,” Richard Nixon viewed the pledge as not
only a stand against the Soviet Union in Asia, but as a statement of self-imposed restraint by both
nations.”*^ Neither China nor the United States would, in the future, threaten any Asian nation unless
it was defensive in nature. The agreement gave China the leeway to reconcentrate its troops
elsewhere, namely the Sino-Soviet border. Nixon would subsequently not have to worry about a direct
confrontation in Southeast Asia with Chinese forces and could reduce American militaiy presence in
the region as his public demanded, substituting instead regional defense pacts for U.S. personnel.
Finally. President Nixon's informal regional agreement with China, too loose to be formally labeled
as an alliance but substantial nonetheless, allowed Nixon to use Sino-American détente against the
Soviet Union to reduce the chances of future Sino-Soviet cooperation against the U.S.^”* Due to
timing more than historical opportunism. Nixon kept both China and the U.S.S.R. divide against each
other by pursuing détente with both of them.
Though cooperation between the two superpowers to prevent future Soviet hegemony in Asia
was a preeminent section of the communiqué, the crux of the document was mutual statements of
policy and intentions concerning the status and future of Taiwan. The Communist Chinese used the
communiqué as a vehicle to assert their unequivocal stand that Taiwan was a province of China, and
until the U.S. recognized that fact, the Taiwan question would continue to be “the crucial question
obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States.””'^ The Communists
firmly believed that issues surrounding Taiwan involved Chinese national interests and should be
handled without American intervention. Moreover, China demanded that the U.S. reduce its
influence on the island and desist form attempts to create two Chinas:
The liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no
other country has the right to interfere: and all U.S. forces and
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militaiy installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The
Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim
at the creation of one China, one Taiwan,’ one China, two
governments.’ two Chinas.’ and independent Taiwan...

For its part, the Nixon administration acknowledged the existence of one China of which
Taiwan was a part. Not only did the American response espouse a peaceful resolution of this conflict
by the Chinese, but it declared that America’s long-term goal was to withdraw military forces from
Taiwan as a key U.S. goal was met;
With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective
of military withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military insta
llations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.^
This pledge mariced a major reversal of U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan; in effecL President
Nixon made clear his intentions of leaving the Taiwanese problem to the Chinese to solve for
themselves in a peaceful manner in exchange for diminishing tensions’ in Asia, a veiled reference to
China’s helpin winding down the war in Vietnam. Deviating from past Cold War policy of taking a
hard-line against Communism and pursuing rigid containmenL Nixon was now willing to make a
complete shift to linkage.
The policy of linkage to achieve foreign policy goals and especially the pressing need to
extricate U.S. forces from Southeast Asia with honor was wholly consistent with Nixon-Kissinger
diplomacy, but others in the American diplomatic establishment viewed the Chinese agreement as a
sell-out of Taiwan. George Ball. President Eisenhower’s Under-Secretary of State, compared Nixon’s
agreement to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Adolph Hitler at Munich, which presaged
Germany’s invasion of Poland. A shocked and disappointed President Thieu of South Vietnam
commented during the China summit that “America has been looking for a better mistress, and now
Nixon has discovered China. He does not want to have the old mistress hanging around. Vietnam has
become old and ugly.”'® Though not entirely accepted by all leaders in the international community,
especially Asian nations such as Japan which worried about America’s future commitment to mutual
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defense pacts, the communique nevertheless represented a significant breakthrough for both the U.S.
and Nixon regarding future of national security and communist contaiiunent.
Though the summit accomplished little substantially regarding major policy changes. Nixon
had established the foundation for a detente with China. After decades of virulent, hawkish rhetoric
aimed against Communists worldwide and advocation of direct aggression against their forces if
necessary. Nixon the pragmatic president realized that a philosophy of silent hostility was counter
productive and potentially dangerous;
...unlike some anti-Communists who think we should refuse to
recognize or deal with the Communists lest in doing so we
imply or extend an ideological respectability to their philo
sophy and their system. 1 have always believed that we can and
must communicate and. when possible, negotiate with
Communist nations. They are too powerfiil to ignore.^®
Many Americans expected that the summit would quickly end hostilities in Vietnam. At a
March 24. 1972 Presidential press conference. Nixon was circumspect about the possible results of his
linkage policy, reiterating that the main purpose of the trip had been to engage in dialogue and that
“as far as Vietnam is concerned. 1 don't think it would be helpful to indicate what was discussed,
what was not discussed. Only time will tell what is going to happen thcre.”^ However, it appeared by
mid-1972 that much more than talking had been on Nixon's mind during the China summit. With his
reelection bid approaching and the war in Vietnam still not over, the President pursued Soviet detente
initiatives in May. 1972.*'

Aftermath; Nixon's Last Great Triumph

Richard Nixon's decision to make detente overtures to Communist China and subsequent
trip to Peking won the support of the American people, but right-wing conservatives were outraged by
his actions, which they feared would lead to China's aimexation of Taiwan.*^ Potential abandonment
of Taiwan was the main conservative objection to Nixon’s detente overtures to the Commimists, as
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several members of Congress, including Republicans, attacked what they believed was the central
message of the communiqué. Future presidential candidate John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) expressed his
indignation with Nixon's blatant reversal of policy by conjuring images of a helpless Taiwanese
people left to the mercy of a hostile Communist regime:
For over two decades, it is we who have fostered and supported, both
by words and deeds, the concept of an independent Republic of China
on Taiwan. Now. in a single week, we have abandoned that position—
and in doing so we have set up the framework to abandon 15 million
people to the tender mercies of a regime , that has managed to slay,
at conservative estimate. 34 million of its own citizens.**
Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minnesota). the Senate's leading liberal voice, publicly doubted Nixon's
veracity regarding his insistence of not negotiating Taiwan's future in secret, and criticized the
President for contradicting the democratic ideal of self-determination in dealing with Taiwan. “It is
now clear.” Humphrey declared, “that the rug has been pulled out from under the Taiwanese, though
the people of the island of Formosa once aspired to determine their own destiny.”*”*
However, criticism of Nixon's initiative was relatively muted compared to mainstream
support for the trip within Congress. Respected Democratic Senators George McGovern and Ted
Kennedy praised Nixon, as did William FullbrighL Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and a consistent critic of Nixon's Vietnam policies. With conservative favorite Ronald
Reagan just off the national center stage ready to mount a right-wing challenge in 1972 if the
president’s popularity waned. Nixon's prospects for holding together his tenuous Republican coalition
received a shot in the arm by the support of Sen. Barry Goldwater gave for the trip.
Press reaction to Nixon's visit in his home region of the West was uniformly positive, as his
longtime allies at the editorial boards of the Los Angeles Times and the San Dieeo Union solidly
supported him without much hint of dissent. Early in the trip, the day after Nixon touched down on
Chinese soil, the Times opined that the mere presence of the President in Peking after years of tension
meant that positive change was virtually imminent:
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...Certainly change is in the air, and what has been publicly seen
of the president’s first days in China vies support to the hope that
change will be for the better . If this means some diminution of
mutual ignorance, then well and good; the two nations and the
world could only be ahead of the game.**
However, certain arch-conservatives refused to credit Nixon for attempting detente with China.
characterizing the mission as a U.S. kow-tow to Communism abroad. The same day that the Times
editorial board praised Nixon for his boldness in visiting Peking, William F. Buckley's column in the
same newspaper ridiculed Nixon for compromising the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. Buckley, an
early Goldwater supporter and longtime conservative spokesman, argued that:
From the point of view of the Communists, it was a masterstroke.
Throughout, we have positioned ourselves as the su{^licants. they
as the presence which, hearing the "knock on the door.’ in Chou
Enlai’s words, permitted the visitor an audience.*®
Published by the Chandler family, powerful Los Angeles Republicans who first endorsed Nixon in
1946 against Jerry Voorhis, the Times suRwrted the President during and after the summit.
buttressing his support among California moderates and conservatives in the aftermath of a risky
political maneuver.
Upon Nixon’s return to Washington, The San Diego Union interpreted domestic support of
the trip as an endorsement of both the president and his initiative, and complimented him for
beginning a new era. T h e dialogue between us and our most outspoken antagonist in the world has
begun auspiciously, due to the exemplary personal statesmanship of the President and First Lacfy.”
The Union editorial board called Nixon “a renowned student of communistic imperialism” who
“certainly realizes that we are playing with fire . He did indeed structure a "week that changed the
world.’ as he said.”*

Though not as supportive. The Arizona Republic endorsed the summit,

commenting that:
The least that can be said for President Nixon’s visit to China is
that he caused the Chinese revolution to make a temporary turn—
from darkest secrecy to partial exposure before the world...Certainly all those Nixon critics who have been blaming him for
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reacting instead of acting received an answer to their criticism
last week.*®

Perhaps most important for Nixon’s media image was the reaction of the nation's major
daily newspapers with mass circulation. His longtime bitterness against the Eastern Establishment not
withstanding, one of its three main organs, the New York Times, tacitly supported the president and
his summit but remained cynical about the Administration’s pre-summit hype that made talks appear
more monumental than they actually were. On Feb. 27. 1972. the Times editorialized that;
Surprise was unwarranted because this summit meeting, unlike others,
was prepared meticulously during the prior conversations of Henry
Kissinger and Chou Enlai. The difficulty evidently encountered in
drafting the communique suggests that there were some gaps, but
unless enough had alreacfy been agreed upon earlier to assure the right
atmosphere, the summit meeting could hardly have taken place. *^
Another national voice of the East Coast establishment, the Wall Street Journal, was much less
restrained in its endorsement of the China trip but recognized that value of its results. In the wake of
the President’s return to the U.S.. the Journal assessed the summit as “as display to the world that the
United States and China are seeking a new and peaceful relationship . That’s what they goL which
makes the trip a success.”®" Although Journal editors remained unconvinced that the trip did much to
resolve Asian instability, their positive words represented elcction-year support from business for the
President’s agenda.
The third leg of the East Coast national daily triumvirate. The Washington Post, perhaps the
most influential Democratically-owned paper in the nation, faintly praised the trip but \vas critical of
Nixon for what it believed was his overdramatics before, during and after Peking. To Post
editorialists, the initiative was “imdeniably a great event... the potential is vast and for this much the
President is entitled to great credit for what was a bold stroke, skillfully brought off by painstaking
and clandestine preparations... ” However, in its final analysis, the Post lambasted Nixon for
apparently misrepresenting what was accomplished in China for his own personal benefiL
undoubtedly for reelection purposes;
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But neither will it be easy for him to make the most of what he
has achieved in Peking if he continues to overstate—or misstate—
the foreseeable gains. This was the week that changed the world.'
he declarded in Shanghai, as his visit ended, and nobotfy would
deny him that . It is enough, for now. to acknowledge a great
event, which speaks for itself, and speaks well for the President.
To embellish it with rhetoric and flamboyance and jazz, as Mr.
Nixon was himself suggested, is to encourage the suspicion that
he doesn’t have all that much to sell.®'
Unfortunately, the darkening clouds of the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s apparent
preoccupation with SALT talks with the Soviet Union slowed Chinese détente in the waning days of
his presidency.®" The power of the American presidency was significantly weakened during this
period and was psychologically carried over into diplomatic affairs in the form of perceived
indecisiveness and diminished U.S. credibility on the international stage.®* However, all was not lost,
as Nixon’s predecessors carried on in the wake of his August 9. 1974 resignation. Nevertheless, a
large element of American leadership in the quest for détente with China was lost with the exit of
Richard Nixon fiom the presidency, a blow that was felt in both the U.S. and Communist China.
Finding it hard to believe that a statesman of Nixon’s caliber could be forced to resign over a
domestic political scandal. Chairman Mao was reported to have told an American official in China.
“Watergate! What reason is that to get rid of a president?'®^

Epilogue: U.S.-China Relations in the Ford and Carter Administrations

Continuing his predecessor’s attempts to reach productive détentes with China as well as the
Soviet Union. President Gerald Ford traveled to Peking in December. 1975. but his talks with new
Communist leader Deng Xiaoping produced neither substantial progress nor an updated
communique.®* The mid-1970s were characterized by increasing threats of Soviet expansionism, and
corresponding Chinese worries that the new American president lacked the resolve or diplomatic
experience to combat the renewal of perceived Soviet designs on Asia. Indeed, during Ford’s visit
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Deng warned him that the danger of war with the U.S.S.R. was growing and American detente talks
with the Soviet Union were increasingly worrisome to the Chinese.®®
For his part. Ford believed that Chinese paranoia regarding the Soviet Union had grown to
the point where thw “seemed in no hurry to press for full diplomatic recognition or the termination of
our long-standing commitments to Taiwan.”® Whether this view resulted from Ford’s own lack of
diplomatic experience with the Chinese or reflected an accurate appraisal of China’s obsession with
Soviet intentions, there is little doubt that his visit occurred during a decline in Sino-American
relations. A less moderate Deng espoused an increasingly hard-line stance against the West, and was
less receptive than his predecessors to détente with the U.S. During the Ford administration there was
generally a loss of diplomatic momentum in China relations thanks to the pressures of presidential
politics. Challenging Ford for the 1976 Republican nomination was Ronald Reagaiu who hammered
his rival for being soft on communism. In response. Ford slowed progress on U.S.-China relations.
Jimmy Carter sought normalized relations with China in order to strengthen his bargaining
position with the Soviets regarding SALT negotiations, regain the momentum Nixon had lost, and
bolster his own foreign policy credentials.®® Like his predecessor Gerald Ford. Carter was cautiously
optimistic about the China question, and sought to continue détente without taking firm action on
Taiwan. Strategic deferment of this nature seems to have been the prevailing policy of all three
administrations, but Carter was particularly sensitive to the issue as by the late 1970s. the Soviets
began closing the missile gap with the United States and were actually ahead of the U.S. in
conventional weapons. Carter depended heavily on his own version of Kissinger, National Security
Advisor 2Ibigniew Brzezinski. Asked in 1978 after the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty about
Carter’s interest in a strategic relationship with China. Brzezinski replied:
I think Carter liked the idea. He knew it would increase his leverage
vis-a-vis the Soviets . But he did not want anything that smacked of
an anti-Soviet American-Chinese alliance, which is what the Chinese
came close to advocating at the time, especially when Deng Xiaoping
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came to America and spent the first evening at my home talking to me
and the others...®®
It was Brzezinski who during the winter of 1977-1978 persuaded Carter to accelerate the
Chinese detente to the level of diplomatic recognition, and in 1978 Brzezinski himself made a trip to
China that ultimately led to normalized U.S.-Chinese relations. " Engaging in talks with ViceChairman Deng, Brzezinski based his negotiations on the common strategic interests of the U.S. and
China, particularly their opposition to Soviet regional hegemony. ' Based on key sections of Nixon’s
communique. Brzezinski’s strategy was bound to upset the Soviets with their emphasis on dominance
in the midst of SALT II negotiations. In the long ruiu however, Brzezinski s aggressive pro-China
policy quelled fears that his policy would drive the Soviets from the bargaining table. Normalized
relations between the United States and Communist China were aimounced by Jimmy Carter on Dec.
15. 1978. six and-a-half years after Richard Nixon’s trip to China. “
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CONCLUSION

In retrospect it appears that Richard Nixon's China initiative was much more a personal
triumph than a seminal event for United States foreign policy. The limited detente with Communist
China did shift the global balancc-of-power at a critical juncture for American national security, and
also increased U.S. diplomatic leverage against the U.S.S.R. for arms control concessions. Of equal
importance was the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, a plan for regional security pacts around
the world that reduced American policing responsibilities in the containment of communism, while at
the same time maintained U.S. military credibility in enforcing defense treaties. Nixon's detente
strategy, an updated version of traditional containment represented diplomatic pragmatism
superseding obsolete and costly dogmatism: America could no longer commit unlimited resources to
conflicts abroad that had neither public support nor clearly defined objectives beyond defeating an
ideology. Nixon realized that the key to avoiding future Vietnams in Asia and further U.S.
entanglements in that region was to extend rapprochement to Communist China, regardless of the
ideological differences between the two nations.
Although no direct link with Nixon’s detente decision can be definitively established. U.S.
commercial interest in the China market a constant since the mid-19th century , may have also played
a role in the initiative. Addressing the National Press Club on June 24. 1971. James C.H. Shen.
Ambassador of the Republic of China said, “much of today’s pressiue for a thaw with Peiping comes
from a handful of business interests seeking profitable mainland markets.”'

Though American

exports to China had never reached more than five percent of the total in the hundred years preceding
Nixon’s trip, large U.S.-based multinational corporations such as General Motors. Xerox. Monsanto

Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Foreign Policv. 39.

84

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

85

and United Air Lines had all expressed interest in trade with China. On May 4. 1971, Pan American
World Airlines President Najeeb E. Halaby told shareholders that the airlines had been seeking
Chinese approval for three years to resume its air route on the Mainland that it served in 1947-1949.
Halatw said he saw “a real possibility of doing so.” and described China as a huge untapped market
Eight years prior to the Nixon trip. Chase Manhattan Bank President David Rockefeller had also
indicated his desire for commercial contacts with Communist China, predicated on not yielding
American principles.*
However, despite the drama of the Peking summit and the respect given to Nixon by the
press after his return, the trip and subsequent Shanghai communique did not end the Vietnam War or
resolve the Taiwan question. The communiqué itself symbolized the general progress made in Peking
and at the very least committed China and the U.S. to mutual cooperation in preventing future Soviet
expansionism in Asia. President Nixon did obtain from the Communist Chinese a pledge to respect
the territorial sovereignty of neighboring nations as well as their form of governments, a major
concession from a Communist superpower championing an ideology of exporting proletarian
revolution. The Shanghai communiqué embodied the principles of the Nixon Doctrine, but postponed
a resolution of the Taiwan question for the sake of friendly relations.
The major beneficiary of Nixon’s trip to China was the President himself. The Peking
summit confirmed his stature as a world diplomat and international television coverage of the even
gave the American public a glimpse of their President taking active steps to end hostilities with the
world’s most populous country. Nixon’s pragmatic diplomacy paid off handsomely in 1972. as he
defeated George McGovern for a second term in the second most lopsided presidential election in
American historv.
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